THE ESSAIES, of Sr FRANCIS BACON *Knight, the Kings Atturney Generall.*

¶ His Religous Meditations.


¶ Places of Perſwaſion and Diſſwaſion.

Seene and allowed.



EDINBVRGH
Printed by ANDRO HART.
1614.

John Young



Academiæ Cantabrigiensis
Liber.

To my Louing Brother, Sr. IOHN CONSTABLE Knight.

MY last Essaies I dedicated to my deare brother Master Anthony Bacon, who is with God Looking amongst my Papers this vacation, I found others of the same nature: which if I my selfe shall not suffer to bee lost, it seemeth the World will not: by the often Printing of the former. Missing my Brother, I found you next, in respect of bond both of neere alliance, and of strait friendship and society, and particularly of communication in studies. Wherein I must acknowledge my selfe beholding to you. For as my businesse found rest in my contemplations: so my contemplations euer found rest in your louing conference and iudgement. So wishing you all good, I remaine.

Your louing Brother and friend,

FRA. BACON.

The Table.

1 OF Religion.
2 Of Death.
3 Of Goodnes, and goodnesse of Nature.
4 Of Cunning.
5 Of Marriage and single life.
6 Of Parents and Children.
7 Of Nobilitie.
8 Of great place.
9 Of Empire.
10 Of Counsell.
11 Of Dispatch.
12 Of Loue.
13 Of Friendship.
14 Of Atheisme.
15 Of Superstition.
16 Of VVisedome for a mans selfe.
17 Of Regiment of Health.
18 Of Expences.
19 Of Discourse.
20 Of Seeming wise.
21 Of Riches.
22 Of Ambition.
23 Of Young Men and Age.
24 Of Beautie.
25 Of Deformitie.
26 Of Nature in Men.
27 Of Customs and Education.
28 Of Fortune.
29 Of Studies.
30 Of Ceremonies and Respect.
31 Of Suters.
32 Of Followers.
33 Of Negociating.
34 Of Faction.
35 Of Praise.
36 Of Iudicature.
37 Of Vaine-glory.
38 Of greatnesse of Kingdomes.
39 Of the Publique.
40 Of warre and Peace.
41 Of Honour and Reputation.

ESSAIES

ESSAIES.

1. *Of Religion.*

THe quarrels, and diuiſions for *Religion*, were euils vnknown to the Heathen: and no maruell; for it is the true God that is the jealous God; & the Gods of the Heathen were good fellowes. But yet the bonds of religious vnity, are ſo to be ſtrengthened, as the bonds of humane ſocietie be not diſſolued. *Lucretius* the Poet, when hee beheld the act of *Agamemnon*, induring and aſſiſting at the ſacrifice of his daughter, concludes with this verſe:

Tantum religio potuit ſuadere malorum?

The Table.

1 OF Religion.
2 Of Death.
3 Of Goodnes, and goodnesse of Nature.
4 Of Cunning.
5 Of Marriage and single life.
6 Of Parents and Children.
7 Of Nobilitie.
8 Of great place.
9 Of Empire.
10 Of Counsell.
11 Of Dispatch.
12 Of Loue.
13 Of Friendship.
14 Of Atheisme.
15 Of Superstition.
16 Of VVisedome for a mans selfe.
17 Of Regiment of Health.
18 Of Expences.
19 Of Discourse.
20 Of Seeming wise.
21 Of Riches.
22 Of Ambition.
23 Of Young Men and Age.
24 Of Beautie.
25 Of Deformitie.
26 Of Nature in Men.
27 Of Custome and Education.
28 Of Fortune.
29 Of Studies.
30 Of Ceremonies and Respect.
31 Of Suters.
32 Of Followers.
33 Of Negociating.
34 Of Faction.
35 Of Praise.
36 Of Iudicature.
37 Of Vaine-glory.
38 Of greatnesse of Kingdomes.
39 Of the Publique.
40 Of warre and Peace.
41 Of Honour and Reputation.

ESSAIES

ESSAIES.

1. *Of Religion.*



He quarrels, and diuiſions for *Religion*, were euils vnknown to the Heathen: and no maruell; for it is the true God that is the jealous God; & the Gods of the Heathen were good fellowes. But yet the bonds of religious vnity, are ſo to be ſtrengthened, as the bonds of humane ſocietie be not diſſolued. *Lucretius* the Poet, when hee beheld the act of *Agamemnon*, induring and aſſiſting at the ſacrifice of his daughter, concludes with this verſe:

Tantum religio potuit ſuadere malorum?

But what would hee haue done, if hee had knowne the maſſacre of *France*, or the powder Treaſon of *England?* Certainly he would haue beene ſeuen times more Epicure and Atheiſt then he was. Nay he would rather haue choſen to be one of the Mad men of *Munſter*, then to haue bene a partaker of thoſe Counſels. For it is better that Religion ſhould deface mens vnderſtanding, thē their pietie and charitie: retaining reaſon only but as an *Engine* and *Chariot driuer* of crueltie and malice. It was a great blaſphemy, when the Deuill ſaid, *I will aſcend, and be like the higheſt:* but it is a greater blaſphemie, if they make God to ſay, *I will deſcend, & be like the Prince of darknes*: & it is no better, when they make the cauſe of *Religion* deſcend to the execrable actions of murthering of Princes, the butchery of people, and fiering of States. Neither is there ſuch a ſinne againſt the perſon of the holy Ghoſt (if one ſhould take it literally) as in ſtead of the likeneſſe of a *Doue*, to bring him downe in the likeneſſe of a *Vulture* or *Rauen*: nor ſuch a ſcandall to their Church, as out of the Barke of Saint *Peter*, to ſet foorth the Flagge of a Barke of *Pirats* and *Aſſaſſins*. Therefore ſince theſe things are the common enemies of humane ſocietie:

ſocietie: Princes by their power: Churches by their Decrees, and all learning, Chriſtian, Morall, of whatſoeuer Sect, or opinion, by their *Mercurie* Rodde, ought to joyne in the damning to Hell for euer, theſe facts, and their ſupports: and in all counſels, concerning Religion, that counſell of the Apoſtle would be prefixed, *Ira hominis non implet iuſtitiam Dei.*

2. *Of Death.*

MEn feare Death, as Children feare to goe in the darke: and as that naturall feare in Children is increaſed with tales, ſo is the other. Certainly the feare of Death is contemplation of the cauſe of it, & the iſſue of it, is religious: but the feare of it, for it ſelfe is weak. Yet in religious Meditations there is mixture of vanity, & of ſuperſtition. You ſhal read in ſome of the Friers Books of mortification, that a man ſhould thinke with himſelfe, what the paine is, if hee haue but his fingers end preſſed, or tortured, & thereby imagine what the paines of Death are, when the whole body is corrupted and diſſolued: when many times, Death paſſeth with leſſe pain then the

torture of a limme. For the moſt vitall parts are not the quickeſt of ſence. And to ſpeake as a Philoſopher or naturall Man, it was wel ſaide, *Pompa mortis magis terret, quàm mors ipſa.* Grones, and Conuulſions, and a diſcoloured face, and friends weeping, & Blackes, and Obſequies, and the like, ſhew death terrible. It is worthy the obſeruing, that there is no paſſion in the minde of man ſo weake, but maſters the feare of Death: and therefore Death is no ſuch Enemie, when a man hath ſo many followers about him, that can win the combat of him. *Reuenge* triumphs ouer Death, *Loue* eſteemes it not, *Honour* aſpireth to it, deliuery from *Ignominie* chuſeth it, *Griefe* flyeth to it, *Feare* preoccupateth it: nay, wee ſay, after *Otho* had ſlaine himſelfe, pittie, (which is the tendreſt of affections) prouoked many to die. *Seneca* ſpeaketh of niceneſſe: *Cogita quàm diù, eadem feceris: Mori velle non tantùm fortis, aut miſer, ſed etiam faſtidioſus poteſt.* It is no leſſe worthy to obſerue how litle alteration in good ſpirits the approches of Death make: but they are the ſame till the laſt. *Auguſtus Cæſar* died in a complement, *Tiberius* in diſſimulation, *Veſpaſian* in a jeſt, *Galba* with a ſentence, *Septimus Severus* in diſpatch: and the like. Certainely the

the *Stoikes* bestowed too much cost vpon Death, & by their great preparations made it appeare more fearefull. Better saith he, *Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponit naturæ.* It is as naturall to die, as to be borne: and to a litle Infant perhaps, the one as painefull, as the other.

3. *Of Goodnes and Goodnes of Nature.*

I Take *Goodnesse* in this sence, the affecting of the *Weale* of men, which is, that the Grecians call *Philanthropia*: for the word *humanity* (as it is vsed) is a litle too light, to expresse it: *Goodnesse* I call the habite, and *Goodnesse of Nature*, the inclination. This of all vertues, is the greatest: being the Character of the *Deitie*: and without it, man is a busie, mischieuous, wretched thing: no better then a kinde of Vermine. *Goodnesse* answereth to the *Theologicall* Vertue *Charity*, and admits not excesse but error. The *Italians* haue an vngracious Prouerbe, *Tanto buon, che valniente*: *So good, that he is good for nothing.* And one of the Doctours of *Italie*, *Nicholas*

Nicholas Machiauel had the cõfidence to put in writting almoſt in plaine tearmes, *That the Chriſtian Faith had giuen vp good men in prey, to thoſe that are tyrannicall and vniuſt*, Which hee ſpake, becauſe indeed there was neuer lawe or Sect, or opinion, did ſo much magnifie goodneſſe, as the Chriſtian Religion doth. Therefore to auoide the ſcandall, & the danger both, it is good to take knowledge of the errors of an habite ſo excellent. Seeke the good of other men, but be not in bondage to their faces or fancies: for that is but facility, and ſoftnes, which taketh an honeſt minde priſoner. Neither giue thou *Æſops* Cocke a Gem, who would be better pleaſed & happier, if he had had a Barly corn. The example of God teacheth the leſſõ truly. He ſendeth his raine, & maketh his ſunne to ſhine vpon the juſt, and vnjuſt: but he doth not rain wealth, nor ſhine honor & vertues vpõ men equally. Common benefits are to be communicate with al, but peculiar benefits with choice. And beware how in making the portraiture, thou breakeſt the Patterne. For Diuinitie maketh the loue of our ſelues the Patterne, the loue of our neighbours but the Portraiture. *Sell all thou haſt, and giue it to the poore, and follow me*, but ſell not all thou haſt, except thou come

and

and follow me: that is, except thou haue a vocation, wherein thou mayest doe as much good with little meanes as with great. For otherwise in feeding the streames, thou driest the Fountaine. Neither is there only a habite of Goodnes, directed by right reason: but there is in some men, euen in Nature, a disposition towardes it: as on the other side, there is a naturall malignitie. For there be, that in their nature doe not affect the good of others: the lighter sort of malignitie, turneth but to a crosnesse, or frowardnesse, or aptnesse to oppose, or difficilnesse, or the like: but the deeper sort, to enuy and niere mischiefe. There be many *Misanthropi*, that make it their practise to bring men to the bough, & yet haue neuer a tree for the purpose in their Gardens, as *Timon* had. Such dispositions are the very errours of humane Nature: and yet they are the fittest Timber to make great Politickes of, like to knee-timber that is good for shippes, that are ordained to be tossed, but not for building Houses that shall stand firme.

Of.

4. *Of Cunning.*

WE take *Cunning* for a ſiniſter or crooked *Wiſedome*: and certainely there is a great difference betweene a Cunning man, and a Wiſe man: not onely in point of honeſty, but in point of abilitie. There be that can packe the Cards, and yet cannot play well. So there are ſome, that are good in canuaſſes & factions, that are otherwiſe weake men. Againe, it is one thing to vnderſtand perſons, & another thing to vnderſtand matters: for many are perfect in mens humours, thar are not greatly capable of the real part of buſineſſe, which is the conſtitution of one, that hath ſtudied men, more then Bookes. Such men are fitter for practiſe then for counſel, & they are good but in their owne Alley, turne them to new men, & they haue loſt their ayme. So as the old rule to know a Foole from a Wiſe man, *Mitte ambos nudos ad ignotos & videbis*, doth ſcarſe holde for them. Euen in buſineſſe there are ſome that knowe the reſorts and fals of buſineſſe, that cannot ſinke into the maine of it: like a Houſe that hath conuenient ſtaires and entries

entries, but neuer a faire roome. Therefore you ſhall ſee them finde out prettie looſes in the concluſion, but are no waies able to examine or debate matters: and yet commonly they take aduantage of their inability, and would be thought wits of direction. Some build rather vpon abuſing others, and as we now ſay, putting tricks vpon them, then vpō ſoundneſſe of their owne proceedings. But *Salomon* ſaith, *Prudens aduertit ad greſſus ſuos: ſtultus diuertit ad dolos.* Very many are the differences betweene Cunning and Wiſedome: & it were a good deed to ſet them downe: for that nothing doth more hurt in ſtate then that cunning men paſſe for wiſe.

5. Of Marriage and Single Life.

HE that hath wife & childrē, hath giuen hoſtages to fortun, for they are impediments to great enterpriſes, either of vertue or miſchiefe. Certainely the beſt works, & of greateſt merite for the publicke, haue proceeded frō the vnmarried, or childles men, which haue ſought eternitie

eternitie in memorie, and not in posterity: and which both in affection and meanes, haue married and endowed the publicke. Yet some there are, that lead a single life, whose thoughts doe ende with themselues, and doe account future times, impertinences. Nay there are some others that esteeme Wife and Children, but as bils of charges. But the most ordinarie cause of a single life, is libertie, especially in certaine selfe-leasing and humorous minds, which are so sensible of euery restriction, as they will goe neere to thinke their girdles and garters to be bonds & shackles. Vnmarried men are best friends, best masters, best seruants, not alwayes best subjects, for they are light to runne away: and almost all fugitiues are of that condition. A single life is proper for Church men. For Charitie will hardly water the ground, where it must first fill a poole. It is indifferent for Iudges and Magistrates. For if they be facile and corrupt, you shal haue a seruant fiue times worse then a wife. For Souldiors, I finde the Generals commonly in their hortatiues, put men in mind of their Wiues, and Children: and I thinke the despising of Marriage amongst the Turkes, maketh the vulgare Souldiour mor base. Certainly, Wife & Children

Children are a kind of diſcipline of humanity: and ſingle men are more cruell and heard-hearted: good to make ſeuere Inquiſitors. Graue natures led by cuſtome, and therefore conſtant, are commonly louing husbands: as was ſaid of *Vliſſes*: *Vitulam prætulit immortalitati*. Chaſt Women are often proud and froward, as preſuming vpon the merite of their chaſtitie. It is one of the beſt bonds both of chaſtity and obedience in the Wife, if ſhe thinke her husband wiſe: which ſhee will neuer doe, if ſhee find him iealous. Wiues are young mens miſtreſſes: Companions for middle age: and old mens nurſes. So as a man may haue a quarrell to marrie when he will: but yet hee was reputed one of the wiſe men, that made anſwere to the queſtion: *When a man ſhould Marrie?* A yong man not yet, an elder man not at all.

6. Of Parents and Children.

THe joyes of *Parents* are ſecret, and ſo are their griefes & feares: they cannot vtter the one, nor they will not vtter

vtter the other. Children ſweeten labours, but, they make misfortunes more bitter: they increaſe the cares of life, but they mitigate the remembrance of Death. The perpetuity by generation, is common to Beaſtes: but memory, merite, and Noble workes, are proper to men. They that are the firſt raiſers of their Houſe, are moſt indulgent towards their Children, beholding them, as the continuance, not onely of their kinde, but of their work: & ſo both Children & Creatures. The difference of affection in Parents towards their ſeuerall Children, is many times vnequall, and ſometimes vnworthy: ſpecially in the mother. as *Salomon* ſaith, *A wiſe Sonne reioyceth the Father, but an vngracious Sonne ſhames the Mother.* A man ſhall ſee where there is a houſe full of children, one, or two of the eldeſt reſpected, and the yongeſt made wantons: but in the middle, ſome that are as it were forgotten, who neuertheleſſe prooue the beſt. The illiberalitie of Parents in allowance towardes their children, is an harmeful error: makes them baſe, acquaints them with ſhifts, makes them ſort with meane company, and makes them ſurfeit more when they come to plentie. And therefore the proofe is beſt when men keepe

keepe their authoritie towards their Children, but not their purſe. Men haue a fooliſh manner, both Parents, Schoolemaſters, and Seruants, in creating and breeding an emulation betweene Brothers during childhood, which many times ſorteth to diſcord when they are men, and diſturbeth families. The *Italians* make little difference betweene Children and Nephewes, or neere Kinsfolk: But ſo they be of the Lumpe, they care not, though they paſſe not through their owne body: and to ſay truth, in nature it is much a like matter, inſomuch, that wee ſee a Nephew ſometimes reſembleth an Vnkle, or a Kinſeman, more then his owne Parent, as the blood happens.

7. Of Nobilitie.

IT is a reuerend thing to ſee an ancient Caſtle or building not in decay: or to ſee a faire timber tree ſound and perfect: how much more to behold an ancient Noble Familie, which hath ſtood againſt the Waues and weathers of time. For new Nobility is but the act of power, but ancient

Nobility is the act of time. The first raisers o
Fortunes are commonly more vertuous, bu
lesse innocent then their descendants. Fo
there is rarely rising, but by a commixtur
of good and euill Arts. But it is reason th
memory of their vertues remaine to tho
posterities, and their faultes die with them
selues. Nobility of birth commonly abatet
industry: and he that is not industrious, en
uyeth him that is: Besides Noble persons
cannot goe much higher: And hee that stan
deth at a stay when others rise, can hardly a
uoide motions of enuy. On the other sid
Nobilitie extinguisheth the passiue enuy i
others towardes them, because they are i
possession of Honor: and enuy is as the sun
beames, that beat more vpon a rising grou
then vpon a leuell. A great Nobility addet
Majestie to a Monarch. but diminisheth po
wer: and putteth life and spirit into the peo
ple, but presseth their fortunes. It is we
whē Nobles are not too great for Soueraig
nity, nor for Iustice, and yet maintained i
that height, as the insolencie of inferiour
may be broken vpō them, before it come o
too fast vpon the Majesty of Kings. Certain
ly Kings that haue able men of their Nob
lity shall finde ease in imploying them, an
a bette

a better ſlid into their buſines: For people naturally bend to them, as borne in ſome ſort to command.

8. *Of great Place.*

MEn in great place, are thriſe ſeruants: Seruants of the Soueraigne or State, Seruants of Fame, & ſeruants of buſineſſe. So as they haue no freedome, neither in their perſons, nor in their actions, nor in their times. It is a ſtrange deſire to ſeeke power, & to loſe liberty: or to ſeeke power ouer others, and to loſe power ouer a mans ſelfe. The riſing vnto place is laborious, and by paines men come vnto greater paines: & it is ſometimes baſe, & by indignities men come to dignities: the ſtanding is ſlippery, & the regreſſe is either a downefall, or at leaſt an Eclipſe, which is a melancholy thing. Nay, retire men cannot when they would, neither will they when it were reaſon, but are impatient of priuatnes, euen in age and ſickneſſe, which require the ſhaddowe. Certainely, great perſons had neede to borrow other mens opinions, to thinke themſelues happy: for if they judge by their owne feeling, they cannot finde it: but if they thinke with themſelues,

what other men thinke of them, and that other men would faine be as they are, then they are happy as it were by report, when perhaps they finde the contrary within: for they are the firſt that find their own griefes, though they be the laſt that find their owne faults. Certainly, men in great fortunes are ſtrangers to themſelues, & while they are in the puzle of buſineſſe, they haue no time to tend their health, either of body or minde. *Illi mors gravis incubat, qui notus nimis omnibus, ignotus moritur ſibi.* In place there is licence to doe good and euill: whereof the latter is a curſe: for in euill the beſt condition is, not to will: the ſecond not to can. But power to do good is the true and lawfull end of aſpiring. For good thoughts (though God accept them) yet towards men are litle better then good dreames: except they be put in Act, and that cannot be without power and place: as the vantage & commanding groũd. Merit is the end of mans motoin: and conſcience of merite is the accompliſhment of mans reſt. For if a man can in any meaſure be partaker of *Gods Theater*, hee ſhall likewiſe be partaker of *Gods reſt*. *Et converſus deus ut aſpiceret opera quæ fecerunt manus ſuæ, vidit quod omnia eſſent bona nimis*, and then the *Sabbath*.

In

In the diſcharge of thy place, ſet before thee the beſt examples, for imitation is a globe of precepts. And after a time, ſet before thee thine owne example, and examine thy ſelfe ſtrictly, whether thou didſt not beſt at firſt: Reforme without brauery or ſcandall of former times and perſons, but yet ſet it downe to thy ſelfe, aſwell to creat good preſidents, as to follow them. Reduce things to the firſt inſtitution, and obſerue wherein, and how, they haue degenerate, but yet aske counſell of both times, of the Ancient time what is beſt, and of the latter time what is fitteſt. Seeke to make thy courſe regular, that men may knowe before hand what they may expect, but be not too poſitiue, and expreſſe thy ſelfe well when thou digreſſeſt from thy rule. Preſerue the rights of thy place, but ſtirre not queſtions of Iuriſdiction: and rather aſſume thy right in ſilence and *de facto*, then voice it with claimes, and challenges. Preſerue likewiſe the rights of inferiour Places, and thinke it more honour, to direct in chiefe, then to be buſie in all. Imbrace and inuite helpes and intelligence, touching the execution of thy place, & doe not driue away ſuch as bring thee informatiõ, as medlers, but accept of them in good part. The

vices of authority are chiefly foure, *Delaye. Corruptions, Roughneſſe*, and *Facilitie*. For Delayes, giue eaſie acceſſe, keepe times appointed, goe through with that which is in hande, and interlace not buſines, but of neceſſity. For Corruption, do not only bind thine own hands, or thy Seruants hands that may take, but binde the hands of them that ſhould offer. For integrity vſed, doth the one, but integrity profeſſed, & with a manifeſt deteſtation of bribbery, doth the other. And auoide not onely the fault, but the ſuſpition. Whoſoeuer is found variable and changeth manifeſtly, without manifeſt cauſe, giueth ſuſpition of corruptiō. A ſeruant or a fauourite if hee be inward, and no other apparant cauſe of eſteeme, is commonly thought but a by-way. For Roughneſſe it is a needleſſe cauſe of diſcontent. Seuerity breedeth feare, but roughnes breedeth hate. Eué reproofes from authority, ought to be graue and not tanting. As for facility, it is worſe then bribery, for bribes come but now and then, but if importunity, or idle reſpects lead a man, he ſhal neuer be without. As *Salomon* ſaith: *To reſpect perſons is not good, for ſuch a man will tranſgreſſe for a piece of bread.* It is moſt true that was anciently ſpoken, *A place ſheweth*

the

the man: and it ſheweth ſome to the better, & ſome to the worſe *Omnium conſenſu capax imperii niſi imperaſſet*, ſaith *Tacitus* of *Galba*, but of *Veſpaſian* he ſaith, *Solus imperantium Veſpaſianus mutatus in melius*: Though the one was meant of ſufficiency, the other of manners and affection. It is aſſured ſigne of a worthy and generous ſpirit, whom Honor amends. For honor is, or ſhould be the place of Vertue: and as in Nature things moue violently to their place, and calmely in their place, ſo Vertue in Ambition is violent, in Authority ſettled and calme.

9. *Of Empire.*

IT is a miſerable State of minde, to haue few things to deſire, & many things to feare: and yet, that commonly is the caſe of Kings, who being at the higheſt, want matter of deſire, which makes their mindes the more languiſhing, & haue many repreſentations of perils and ſhaddowes, which makes their mindes the leſſe cleere. And this is one reaſon alſo of that effect, which the Scripture ſpeaketh of, *That the Kings heart is inſcrutable.* For multitudes of

jealousies, & lack of some predominãt desire, that should marshall and put in order all the rest, maketh any mans heart hard to finde or sound. Hence cõmeth it likewise, that Princes many times make themselues desires, and set their hearts vpon toyes, sometimes vpon a building, sometimes vpon an order, sometimes vpon the aduancing of a person, sometimes vpon obtaining excellency in some Art, or feate of the hand: & such like things, which seeme incredible to those that know not the principle, *That the mind of man is more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small things, then by standing at a stay in great.* Therefore great and fortunate Conquerours in their first yeeres, turne melancholy, and superstitious in their latter, as did *Alexander* the great, and in our memory *Charles* the fifth, & many others. For he that is vsed to goe forward, & findeth a stop, falleth out of his own fauour. A true temper of gouernmẽt is a rare thing: For both temper and distemper consist of contraries. But it is one thing to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. The answere of *Apolonius* to *Vespasian* is full of excellent instruction. *Vespasian* asked him *What was Neroes ouerthrow?* he answered *Nero could touch and tune the Harpe well: But in gouernment*

sometimes

ſometimes he vſed to winde the pinnes too hie, and ſometimes to let them downe to lowe. And certaine it is, that nothing deſtroyeth authority ſo much, as the vnequall and vntimely interchange of preſsing power and relaxing power. The wiſedome of all theſe latter times, in Princes affaires, is rather fine delineries, and ſhiftings of daungers and miſchiefes when they are neere, then ſolid and grounded courſes to keepe them aloofe. But let men beware how they neglect and ſuffer matter of trouble to bee prepared: for no man can forbid the ſparke, nor tell whence it may come. The difficultneſſe in Princes buſineſſe are many times great, but the greateſt difficulty, is often in their owne mind. For it is common with Princes (ſaith *Tacitus*) to will contradictories. *Sunt plerumque Regum voluntates vehementes, & inter ſe contrariæ.* For it is the Soloeciſme of power, to thinke to command the end, and yet not to endure the meane. *Princes* are like to the heauenly bodies, which cauſe good or euill times: and which haue much veneration, but no reſt. All precepts concerning Kings, are in effect comprehended in thoſe two remembrances. *Memento quod es homo*, and *Memento quod es Deus*, or *Vice dei*: The one

one to bridle their power, and the other their will.

10. *Of Counsell.*

THe greatest trust betweene men, is the trust of giuing Counsell. For in other confidences men commit the partes of their life their Lands, their goods, their childe, their credite, to some particular affaire. But to such as they make their Counsellours, they commit the whole, by how much the more they are obliged to all faith, and integritie. The wisest Princes neede not thinke it any diminution to their greatnesse, or derogation to their sufficiency to relie vpon counsell. God himselfe is not without: but hath made it one of the great names of his blessed Son, *The Counsellor Solomon* hath pronounced: that *In Counsell is stabilitie.* Things will haue their first or second agitation: if they bee not tossed vpon the Arguments of Counsel, they will bee tossed vpon the waues of *Fortune*: and bee full of inconstancie, doing, and vndoing, like the reeling of a drunken

ken man. *Salomons* Sonne found the force of Counſell, as his Father ſawe the neceſſity of it. For the beloued Kingdome of God was firſt rent and broken by ill Counſell: vpon which Counſell, there are ſet for our inſtruction, the two markes whereby badde Counſell is for euer beſt diſcerned, that it was young Counſell for the perſons, and violent counſell for the matter. The ancient times doe ſet forth in figure, both the incorporation, and inſeparable coniunction of Counſell with *Kings*, and the wiſe and polliticke vſe of Counſell by *Kings*: the one, in that they ſay *Iupiter* did marrie *Metis* (which ſignifieth Counſell) So as Soueraignety or Authority is married to Counſell. The other in that which followeth: which was thus: They ſay after *Iupiter* was married to *Metis*, ſhee conceiu'd by him, and was with child, but *Iupiter* ſuffred her not to ſtay till ſhe brought forth, but eate her vp: whereby he became with child and was deliuered of *Pallas* armed out of his head. Which monſtrous fable containeth a ſecret of *Empire*, How Kings are to make vſe of their Counſel of State. That firſt they ought to refer matters to them, which is the firſt begetting, or impregnation: but when

when they are elaborate, moulded, and ſnaped in the Wombe of their Counſel,& grow ripe, and ready to be brought forth: that then they ſuffer not their Counſell to goe thorow,with the reſolution and direction,as if it depended on them: but take the matter backe into their owne hand,and make it appeare to the World, that the decrees & finall directions (which becauſe they come forth with prudence,and power, are reſembled to *Pallas* armed) proceeded from themſelues: and not onely from their authoritie, but (the more to adde reputation to themſelues) from their head and deuice. The inconueniences that haue beene noted in calling and vſing counſell, are three. Firſt, the reuealing of affaires, whereby they become the leſſe ſecret. Secondly, the weakning of the authroity of Princes, as if they were leſſe of themſelues. Thirdly, the danger of being vnfaithfully counſelled, and more for the good of them that counſell, then of him that is counſelled. For which inconueniences, the Doctrine of *Italy*, & practiſe of *Fraunce*, hath introduced *Cabaret* Counſels, a remedie worſe then the diſeaſe. But for ſecrecy, Princes are not bound to communicate all matters with all Counſellours, but may extract

and ſelect. Neither is it neceſſary, that hee that conſulteth what he ſhould doe, ſhould declare what he will doe. But let *Princes* beware that the vnſecreting of their affaires come not from themſelues. And as for *Cabanet* Counſell, it may be their *Mot*, *Plenus rimarum ſum*. One futile perſon, that maketh it his glory to tell, will doe more hurt, then many that know it their dutie to conceale. For weakening of authoritie, the fable ſheweth the remedy: neither was there euer Prince bereaued of his dependances by his Counſell, except where there hath beene either an ouergreatneſſe in one, or an ouer-ſtrict combination in diuerſe: for the laſt inconuenience that men will counſell with an eye to themſelues. Certainely, *Non inuenit fidem ſuper terram*, is meant of the Nature of times, and not of all particuler perſons. There be that are in nature of faithfull and ſincere, and plaine, and direct, not craftie and inuolued. Let Princes aboue all, draw to themſelues ſuch natures. Beſides, Counſels are not commonly ſo vnited, but that one keepeth Sentinell ouer another. But the beſt remedy is, if *Princes* know their Councellours, as well as their Counſellours know them, *Principis eſt virtus maxima noſſe ſuos.*

suos. And of the other side, Counsellours should not be too speculatiue into their soueraignes person. The true composition of a Councellor, is rather to be skilfull in their Masters busines, then in his nature: For then he is like to aduise him, and not to feed his humor. It is of singuler vse to *Princes*, if they take the opinions of their Counsell, both separately and together. For priuate opinion is more free, but opinion before others, is more reuerent. In priuat, men are more bold in their owne humours, and in comfort, men are more obnoxious to others humours. Therefore it is good to take both, and of the inferiour sort, rather in priuate to preserue freedome: of the greater rather in consort, to preserue respect. It is in vaine for Princes to take Counsell concerning matters, if they take no Counsell likewise concerning persons. For all matters are as dead Images, and the life of the execution of affaires resteth in the good choise of persons. Neither is it enough to consult concerning persons, *Secundum genera*, as in an *Idea*, or Mathematical description, what kind of person should bee: but in *Indiuiduo*: For the greatest errours, and the greatest iudgements are shewed in the choice of *Indiuiduals*. It was truely said,

Optimi

Optimi Conſiliary mortui. Bookes will ſpeake plaine, when Counſellours blanch. Therfore it is good to be conuerſant in them, ſpecially the Bookes of ſuch as then ſelues haue beene Actors vpon the Stage.

II. *Of Diſpatch.*

AFfected diſpatch is one of the moſt dangerous things to buſines that can be. It is like that which the *Phiſitians* call pre-digeſtion, or haſty digeſtion, which is ſure to fill the body ful of Crudities and ſecret ſeeds of diſeaſes. Therfore meaſure not Diſpatch by the times of ſitting, but by the aduancement of the buſineſſe. It is the care of ſome only to come off ſpeedily for the time, or to contriue ſome falſe periods of buſineſſe, becauſe they may ſeeme men of Diſpatch. But it is one thing to make ſhort by contracting, another by cutting off: and buſineſſe ſo handled by peeces, is commonly protracted in the whole. I knew a wiſe man had it for a by-word, when hee ſawe men haſten to a concluſion: *Stay a little that Wee*

may

may make an end the ſooner. On the other ſide, true Diſpatch is a rich thing. For time is the meaſure of buſineſſe, as Money is of Warres: and buſineſſe is bought at a deare hand where there is ſmall diſpatch. Giue good hearing to thoſe that giue the firſt information in buſines, and rather direct them in the beginning, then interrupt them in the continuance of their ſpeeches: For he that is put out of his owne order, will goe forward and backewards, and be more tedious by parcels, then he could haue bene at once. But ſometimes it is ſeene, that the *moderator* is more troubleſome, thē the *Actor*. Iterations are commonly loſſe of time, but there is no ſuch gaine of time, as to iterate often the ſtate of the queſtion. For it chaſeth away many a friuolous ſpeech, as it is comming forth. Long and curious ſpeeches are as fit for diſpatch, as a Robe or Mantle with a long traine, is for race. Prefaces, and paſſages, and excuſations, and other ſpeeches of reference to the perſon, are great waſtes of time, and though they ſeeme to proceede of modeſty, they are brauery. Yet beware of being too materiall, when there is any impediment, or obſtruction in mens will. For preoccupation euer requireth

reth preface : like a fomentation to make the vnguent enter. Aboue all things, order and diſtribution is the life of Diſpatch : ſo as the diſtribution bee not too ſubtill : For hee that doth not diuide, will neuer enter well into buſineſſe: and he that diuideth too much, will neuer come out of it clearely. To chuſe time, is to ſaue time, and an vnſeaſonable motion is but beating the ayre. There be three parts of buſineſſe : the preparation, the debate, or examination, and the perfection. Whereof if you looke for Diſpatch, let the middle onely be the worke of many, and the firſt and laſt the worke of few. The proceeding vpon ſomewhat conceiued in writing, doth for the moſt part facilitate Diſpatch. For though it ſhould bee wholy reiected, yet that Negatiue is more pregnant of a direction, then an indefinite: as Aſhes are more generatiue then duſt.

12. *Of Loue.*

LOue is the Argument alwayes of *Comedies*, and many times of *Tragedies*. Which ſheweth well, that it is a paſsion

generally light, and ſome-times extreame. Extreame it may well be, ſince the ſpeaking in a perpetuall *Hyperbole*, is comely in nothing, but *Loue*. Neither is it meerely in the phraſe. For whereas it hath bene well ſaide, that the *Arch flatterer* with whom all the petty flatterers haue intelligence, is a Mans ſelfe, certainly the louer is more. For there was neuer proud man thought ſo abſurdly well of himſelfe, as the Louer doth of the perſon loued: and therefore it was well ſaid, that it is impoſsible to loue, & to be wiſe. Neither doth this weakeneſſe appeare to others onely, and not to the party loued, but to the loued moſt of all, except the loue be reciproque For it is a true rule, that Loue is euer rewarded either with the reciproque, or with an inward and ſecret contempt. By how much the more, men ought to beware of this paſsion, which looſeth not only other things, but it ſelfe. As for the other loſſes, the Poets relation doth well figure them: That he that preferred *Helena*, quitted the guifts of *Iuno* and *Pallas*. For whoſoeuer reſteemeth too much of amorous affection, quitteth both riches and wiſdome. This paſsion hath his flouds in the very times of weakeneſſe: Which are great

proſ-

prosperitie, and great aduersitie, (though this latter hath beene lesse obserued.) Both which times kindle Loue and make it more feruent, and therfore shew it to be the Child of folly. They doe best that make this affection keepe quarter, and seuer it wholly from their serious affaires and actions of their life. For if it checke once with businesse, it troubleth Mens fortunes, and maketh Men, that they can no wayes be true to their owne endes.

13. *Of Friendship.*

THere is no greater Desert or wilderneſſe then to be without true friends. For without Friendship society is but meeting. And as it is certaine, that in bodies inanimate, vnion strengtheneth any naturall motion & weakneth any violent motion, So amongst men, Friendship multiplieth ioyes, and diuideth griefs. Therfore whosoeuer wanteth fortitude let him worship *Friendship*. For the yoke of *Friendship* maketh the yoke of *Fortune* more

There be ſome whoſe liues are, as if they perpetually plaid vpon a ſtage, diſguiſed to all others, open onely to themſelues. But perpetuall diſsimulation is painefull: and he that is all *Fortune*, and no *Nature*, is an exquiſite *Hireling*. Liue not in continuall ſmother, but take ſome friends with whom to communicate. It will vnfold thy vnderſtanding, it will euaporate thy affections, it will prepare thy buſineſſe. A man may keep a corner of his mind from his friend, and it be but to witneſſe to himſelfe, that it is not vpon facilitie, but vpon true vſe of friendſhip that he imparteth himſelfe. Want of true friends, as it is the reward of perfidious natures: ſo is it an impoſition vpon great fortunes. The one deſerue it, and the other cannot ſcape it. And therefore it is good to retaine ſinceritie, and to put it into the reckoning of *Ambition*, that the higher one goeth, the fewer true Friends he ſhall haue. Perfection of Friendſhip, is but a ſpeculation. It is friendſhip, when a man can ſay to himſelfe, I loue this man, without reſpect of vtility. I am open hearted to him, I ſingle him from the generality of thoſe with whom I liue: I make him a portion of my owne wiſhes.

14. *Of Atheiſme.*

I Had rather beleeue all the fables in the *Legend*, and the *Alcaron*, then that this vniuerſall frame is without a mind. And therefore God neuer wrought myracle to conuince Atheiſts, becauſe his ordinary workes conuince them. Certainely, a little *Philoſophie* inclineth mans mind to *Atheiſme*, but depth in *Philoſphie*, bringeth men about to Religion. For when the mind of man looketh vpon ſecond cauſes ſcattered, ſometimes it reſteth in them: but when it beholdeth them confederate, and knit together, it flies to prouidence, and *Deity*. Moſt of all, that Schoole which is moſt accuſed of Atheiſme doth demonſtrate Religion. That is, the Schoole of *Leucippus*, and *Democritus*, & *Epicurus*. For it is a thouſand times more credible, that foure mutable Elements, & one immutable fifth Eſſence, duely and eternally placed, need no God, then that an Army of infinite ſmall portions of ſeeds vnplaced, ſhould haue produced this order, and beauty, without a diuine Marſhall. The Scripture ſaith, *The foole hath ſaid in his heart, there is no God.* It is not ſaid, *The foole hath thought in his heart.* So as he rather ſaith it by rote to him-

ſelfe, as that he would haue, then that hee can throughly beleeue it, or be perſwaded of it. For none deny there is a God, but thoſe for whom it maketh, that there were no God. *Epicurus* is charged that he did but diſſemble for his credits ſake, when he affirmed there were bleſſed natures, but ſuch as enioyed themſelues, without hauing reſpect to the gouernment of the World. Wherein they ſay, he did temporize, though in ſecret, he thought, there was no God. But certainly he is traduced. for his words are Noble and Diuine. *Non Deos vulgi negare profanum, ſed vulgi opiniones Diis applecare profanum.* *Plato* could haue ſaid no more. And although hee had the confidence to deny the adminiſtration, he had not the power to deny the nature. The *Indians* of the Weſt, haue names for their particular Gods, though they haue no name for God: as if the Heathens ſhould haue had the names, *Iupiter, Apollo, Mars, &c.* but not the word *Deus*, which ſhewes yet they haue the notion, though not the ful extent. So that againſt Atheiſts, the moſt barbarous Sauages, take part with the ſubtilleſt Philoſophers. They that deny a God, deſtroy mans Nobility. For certainly, Man is of kin to the Beaſts by his body: and if hee be not

of

of kin to God by his Spirit, he is a baſe and Ignoble Creature. It deſtroyes likewiſe magnanimity, and the raiſing of humane nature. For, take an exſample of a Dogge, and marke what a generoſity and courage he wil put on, when he findes himſelfe maintained by a Man, which to him, is in ſtead of a God, or *Melior natura*: Which courage is manifeſtly ſuch, as that Creature, without that confidence of a better nature then his owne, could neuer attaine. So man when he reſteth and aſſureth himſelfe vpon Diuine protection and fauour, gathereth a force, and faith, which humane nature in it ſelfe could not obtaine. Therfore as *Atheiſme* is in all reſpects hatefull, So in this, that it depriueth humane nature of the meanes to exa't it ſelfe aboue humane frailtie. As it is in particuler perſons: ſo it is in Nations. Neuer was there ſuch a State for magnanimitie as *Rome*, Of this State, heare what *Cicero* ſaith: *Quam volumus licet P. Conſ. nos amemus, tamen nec numero Hiſpanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Grecos, nec denique hoc ipſo huius gentes & terræ domeſtico natiuoque ſenſu Italos ipſos & Latinos: ſed pietate, ac Religione, atque hac vna ſapientia quod Deorum immortalium*

numine omnia regi gubernarique perſpeximus, omnes gentes, Nationſque ſuperauimus.

12. *Of Superſtition.*

IT were better to haue no oppinion of God at all, then ſuch an opinion as is vnworthy of him: For the one is vnbeliefe, the other is *Contumely*, and certainely Superſtition is the reproch of Deity. *Atheiſme* leaues a man to ſenſe, to Philoſophy, to naturall piety, to lawes, to reputation, all which may be guides to vertue, though Religion were not: but Superſtition diſmounts all theſe, & erecteth an abſolute Tyranny in the mind of men. Therfore *Atheiſme* did neuer perturbe States: for it makes men wary of themſelues, as looking no further: and we ſee the times inclined to *Atheiſme*, as the time of *Auguſtus Cæſar*, and our owne times in ſome Countries, were, and are, ciuill times. But Superſtition, hath bene the confuſion of many States: and bringeth in a newe *Primum Mobile* that rauiſheth all the Spheres of gouernment. The maſter of

of Superſtition is the people: and in all Superſtition, wiſe men follow fooles, and arguments are fitted to practiſe, in a reuerſed order. There is no ſuch Atheiſt, as an Hypocrit, or Impoſtor: & it is not poſſible, but where the generality is ſuperſtitious, many of the leaders are hypocrites. The cauſes of *Atheiſme* are, diuiſions in Religion, ſcandall of Prieſts, and learned times, ſpecially if proſperous, though for diuiſions, any one maine diuiſion, addeth zeale to both ſides, but many diuiſions introduce *Atheiſme*. The cauſe of Superſtition are the pleaſing of ceremonies, the exceſſe of outward holineſſe, the reuerence of traditions, the Stratagems of Prelats for their owne ambition and lucre, and barbarous times, ſpecially with calamities, and diſaſters. Superſtition without his vaile, is a deformed thing, for as it addeth deformity to an Ape, to be ſo like a man: ſo the ſimilitude of Superſtition to Religion, makes it the more deformed. And as wholſome meat corrupteth to little wormes, ſo good formes and orders corrupt into a number of petty obſeruances.

16. Wiſe-

16. *Wiſedome for a mans ſelfe.*

AN *Ante* is a wiſe Creature for it ſelfe: But it is a ſhrewd thing in an Orchard or Garden. And certainly men that are great louers of themſelues, waſt the publike. Diuide with reaſon betweene ſelfe loue, and ſociety: and bee ſo true to thy ſelfe, as thou bee not falſe to others. It is a poore Centre of a mans actions, *Himſelfe*. It is right earth. For that only ſtands faſt vpon his owne Centre, whereas al things that haue affinity with the heauens, mooue vpon the Centre of another, which they benefit. The referring of all to a mans ſelfe, is more tollerable in a Soueraigne Prince, becauſe thēſelues are not themſelues, but their good and euil is at the perill of the publike fortune. But it is a deſperate euill in a ſeruant to a Prince, or a Citizen in a *Republike*. For whatſoeuer affaires paſſe ſuch a mans hande, he crooketh them to his owne endes: which muſt needes be often *Eccentrike* to the ends of his maſter o rſtate. Therfore let Princes or States, chuſe ſuch Seruants as haue not this marke, except they meane

meane their ſeruice ſhould be made but the acceſſary And that which maketh the effect more pernicious, is, that all proportion is loſt. It were diſproportion enough for the Seruants good to bee preferred before the maſters: But yet it is a greater extreame, whē a litle good of the ſeruants, ſhal carrie things againſt a great good of the maſters. And yet that is the caſe: for the good ſuch ſeruants receiue, is after the modell of their own fortune: but the hurt they ſell for that good, is after the modell of their maſters Fortune. And certainely it is the nature of extreame ſelfe-louers, as they will ſet an houſe on fire, and it were but to roſt their Egges, and yet theſe men many times holde credite with their maſters, becauſe their ſtudie is but to pleaſe them, and profite themſelues, and for either reſpect they will abandon the good of their affaires.

17. *Of Regiment of health.*

THere is a wiſedome in this, beyond the rules of Phyſicke. A mans owne obſeruation what he findes good of, and

and what hee finds hurt of, is the beſt Phyſicke to preſerue health. But it is a ſafer concluſion to ſay, this agreeth not well with me, therefore I wil not continue it, then this, I finde no offence of this, therefore I may vſe it: for ſtrength of Nature in youth, paſſeth ouer many exceſſes, which are owing a man till his age. Diſcerne of the comming on of yeeres: and thinke not to do the ſame things ſtill. Certainely moſt luſty old men catch their death by that aduenture: For age will not be defied. Beware of ſudden change in any great point of diet, & if neceſſity enforce it, fit the reſt to it. For it is a ſecret both in Nature and State, that it is ſafer to change many things, then one. To be free minded and chearefully diſpoſed at houres of meat, and of ſleepe, and of exerciſe, is the beſt precept of long laſting. If you fly Phyſicke in health altogether, it will bee too ſtrange for your body, when you ſhall neede it: if you make it too familiar, it will worke no extraordinary effect, when ſickneſſe commeth. Deſpiſe no new accident in your body but aske opinion of it. In ſickneſſe reſpect Health principally, and in Health action. For thoſe that put their bodies to endure in Health, may in moſt ſickneſſes, which

are

are not very ſharpe, be cured only with diet and tendering. *Celſus* could neuer haue ſpoken it as a Phyſician, had he not bene a wiſe man withall: when hee giueth it for one of the great precepts of health & laſting That a man doe vary and interchange contraries, but with an inclinatiõ to the more benigne extreame: vſe faſting and full eating: but rather full eating: watching and ſleepe, but rather ſleepe: ſitting and exerciſe, but rather exerciſe, and the like. So ſhall Nature be cheriſhed, & yet taught maſteries. Phyſicians are ſome of them ſo pleaſing and conformable to the humours of the patient, as they preſſe not the true cure of the diſeaſe, & ſome other are ſo regular, in procceding according to art for the diſeaſe, as they reſpect not ſufficiently the cõdition of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or if it may not be found in one man, combine two of both ſorts: and forget not to call as well the beſt acquainted with your body, as the beſt reputed of for his faculty.

18. *Of*

18. *Of Expences.*

RIches are for ſpending, and ſpending for honour and good actions. Therefore extraordinary Expence muſt be limited by the worth of the occaſion, for voluntary vndoing may be as wel for a mans Countrey, as for the Kingdome of Heauen. But ordinary Expence ought to be limited by a Mans eſtate, and gouerned with ſuch regard, as it be within his compaſſe, and not ſubject to deceit, and abuſe of Seruants: and ordered to the beſt ſhew, that the Bils may bee leſſe then the eſtimation abroad. It is no baſeneſſe for the greateſt to deſcend and looke into their owne Eſtates. Some forbeare it not vpon negligence alone, but doubting to bring themſelues into melancholie, in reſpect they ſhall finde it broken. But wounds cannot be cured without ſearching. He that cannot looke into his owne eſtate at all, had need both chuſe well thoſe whome hee imployeth, & change them often: for new are more timorous, and leſſe ſubtle. He that can looke into his eſtate but ſeldome, had neede

turne

turne all to certainties. In clearing of a mans Eſtate, he may aſwell hurt himſelfe in being too ſuddaine, as in letting it runne on too long. For haſty ſelling is commonly as diſaduantageable as intereſt. Beſides, he that cleares at once will relapſe: for finding himſelfe out of ſtraights, he will reuert to his cuſtomes. But he that cleareth by degrees, induceth an habite of frugality, and gaineth as well vpon his mind, as vpon his Eſtate. Certainly, who hath a State to repaire, may not deſpiſe ſmall things, and commonly it is leſſe diſhonourable to abridge petty charges, then to ſtoope to petty gettings. A man ought warily to begin charges, which once begun, muſt continue. But in matters that returne not, he may be more magnificent.

19. *Of Diſcourſe.*

SOme in their Diſcourſe, deſire rather commendation of wit, in beeing able to holde all Arguments then of *judge*ment in diſcerning what is true, as if it were a praiſe to know what might be ſaide, and not what ſhould be thought. Some haue certaine

certaine common places & Theames, wherein they are good, and want varietie: which kind of pouerty is for the most part tedious, and now and then ridiculous. The honourablest kind of talke, is to giue the occasion, & againe to moderate and passe to somewhat else. It is good to varry, and mixe speech of the present occasion with argument: tales with reasons, asking of questions, with telling of opinions: and jest with earnest. But some things are priuiledged from jest, namely Religion, matters of State, great persons, any mans present businesse of importance, & any case that deserueth pitty, and generally men ought to finde the difference betweene saltnesse and bitternesse. Certainely hee that hath a Satyricall veine, as he maketh others afraid of his wit, so he had neede be afraid of others memory. He that questioneth much shall learne much, and content much: specially if hee apply his questions to the skill of the persons of whom he asketh: For he shall giue them occasion to please themselues in speaking, and himselfe shall continually gather knowledge. If you dissemble sometimes your knowledge of that you are thought to know, you shall be thought another time to know that you know not. Speech of a mans

selfe

ſelfe is not good often, and there is but one caſe wherein a man may commend himſelfe with good grace, & that is in commending vertue in another, eſpecially, if it bee ſuch a vertue, as where-unto himſelfe pretendeth. Speech of touch toward others, ſhould bee ſparingly vſed: For Diſcourſe ought to be as a field, without comming home to any man. Diſcretiõ of ſpeech is more then eloquence: and to ſpeake agreably to him with whome wee deale, is more then to ſpeake in good words or in good order. A good continued ſpeech without a good ſpeech of interlocution, ſheweth ſlowneſſe: and a good reply, or ſecond ſpeech, without a good ſettled ſpeech, ſheweth ſhallowneſſe and weakneſſe: as we ſee in Beaſtes, that thoſe that are weakeſt in the courſe, are yet nimbleſt in the turne. To vſe too many circumſtances ere one come to the matter, is weariſome, to vſe none at all, is blunt.

20. *Of ſeeming wiſe.*

IT hath beene an opinion, that the *French* are wiſer then they ſeeme, & the *Spaniards*

seeme wiser then they are: But howsoeuer it be betweene Nations, certainely it is so betweene Man and Man. For as the Apostle saith of Godlinesse: *Hauing a shew of Godlines, but denying the power thereof*: So certainly there are in point of Wisedome and sufficiency, that do nothing or litle very solemnly, *Magna comatu nugas.* It is a ridiculous thing, & fit for a Satyre to persons of Iudgements, to see what shifts these formalists haue, and what perspectiues to make *Superficies* to seeme body, that hath depth and bulke. Some are so close and reserued, as they wil not shew their Wares but by a darke light, and seeme alwayes to keepe backe somewhat: and when they knowe within themselues, they speake of that they doe not well know, would neuertheless seeme to others, to know of that which they may not well speake: Some helpe themselues with countenance and gesture, & are wise by signes, as *Cicero* saith of *Piso*, that when hee answered him, hee fetched one of his browes vp to his forehead, and bent the other downe to his Chin: *Respondes altero ad frontem sublato, altero ad mentem depresso supercilio, crudelitatem tibi non placere.* Some thinke to beare it by speaking a great word, and being peremptory, and will goe on and take

by

by admittance that which they cannot make good. Some, whatſoeuer is beyond their reach, they will ſeme to deſpiſe or make light of, as impertinent or curious, and ſo would haue their *Ignorance* ſeeme *judgement*. Some are neuer without a difference, and commonly by amuſing men, with a ſubtilty, blanch the matter. Of whom *Gellius* ſaith, *Hominem delirum qui verborum minutiis rerum frangit pondera.* Of which kinde alſo *Plato* in his *Protagoras* bringeth in *Prodicus* in ſcorne, and maketh him make a ſpeech that conſiſteth of diſtinctions from the beginning to the end. Generally, ſuch men in all deliberations, finde eaſe to be of the Negatiue ſide, and affect a credite to obiect & fore-tell difficulties. For when proportions are denied, there is an end of them, but if they be allowed, it requireth a newe worke: which falſe point of wiſedome, is the bane of buſineſſe. To conclude, there is no decaying Merchant, or inward Begger, hath ſo many trickes to vphold the credite of their wealth, as theſe empty perſons haue to maintaine the credit of their ſufficiency.

21. *Of Riches.*

I Cannot call Riches better then the baggage of Vertue, the Romane worde is better *impedimenta*: for as the baggage is to an Army, ſo is Riches to Vertue: It cannot be ſpared, nor left behind, but it hindreth the March, yea, & the care of it ſometimes loſeth or diſturbeth the victory. Of great Riches there is no reall vſe, except it be in the diſtribution: the reſt is but conceit. So ſaith *Salomon*: *Where much is, there are many to conſume it: and what hath the owner but the ſight of it with his eyes?* The perſonal fruition in any man, cannot reach to feele great Riches, there is a cuſtody of them, or a power of *Dole* and donatiue of them, or a fame of them, but no ſolide vſe to the owner. Doe you not ſee what fained prizes are ſet vpon litle ſtones, and rarieties, and what workes of oſtentation are vndertaken, becauſe there might ſeeme to be ſome vſe of great Riches? But then they may be of vſe to buy men out of dangers or troubles: as *Salomon* ſaith, *Riches are as a ſtrong holde in*

the

the imagination of the Rich Man. But this is excellently expreſſed, that it is in *Imagination*, and not alwayes in fact. For certainly, great Riches haue ſold more Men then they haue bought out. Seeke not proud Riches but ſuch as thou maiſt get juſtly, vſe ſoberly, diſtribute cheerefully, and liue contentedly. Yet haue no abſtract, nor Frierly contempt of them. But diſtinguiſh, as *Cicero* ſaith well of *Rabirius Poſthumus*, *In ſtudio rei ampliſicandæ, apparebat non auaritiæ prædam ſed inſtrumentum bonitati quæri.* Neither truſt thou much others, that ſeeme to deſpiſe them: For they deſpiſe them that diſpaire of them, and none worſe, when they come to them. Be not peny-wiſe, Riches haue wings, and ſometimes they fly away of themſelues, ſomtimes they muſt be ſet flying, to bring in more. Men leaue their riches, either to their kindred, or to the publike: and moderate portions proſper beſt in both. A great ſtate left to an Heire, is as a lure to all the birds of prey round about, to ſeize on him, if hee be not the better ſtabliſhed in yeres & judgment. Likewiſe glorious giftes and foundations, are but the painted Sepulchres of *Almes*, which ſoone will putrifie and corrupt inwardly. Therefore meaſure not thy

aduancements by quantity, but frame them by measure,& defer not charities, till death, for certainely, if a man weigh it rightly, hee that doth so, is rather liberall of another mans, then of his owne.

22. *Of Ambition.*

Ambition is like choller, which is an humour that maketh men actiue, earnest, full of alacrity, and stirring, if it be not stopped. But if it bee stopped, and cannot haue his way, it becommeth a dust, and thereby maligne and venomous. So ambitious men, if they finde the way open for their rising, and still get forward, they are rather busie then dangerous: but if they be checked in their desires, they become secretly discontent, and looke vpon men and matters, with an euill eye, and are best pleased when things goe backeward: which is the worst property that can be in a seruant of a *Prince*, or State. Therefore it is good for *Princes*, if they vse ambitious men, to handle it so, as they be still progressiue, & not retrograde: which because it cannot bee with

without inconuenience, it is good not to vſe ſuch natures at all. For if they riſe not with their ſeruice, they will take order to make their ſeruice fall with them. Of Ambitions, it is the leſſe harmefull, the Ambition to preuaile in great things, then that other to appeare in euery thing: For that breedes confuſion, and marres buſineſſe. He that ſeeketh to be eminent amongſt able men, hath a great taske: but that is euer good for the publike. But he that plots to be the only figure amongſt Cyphers, is the decay of an whole Age. Honour hath three things in it: The vantage ground to doe good, The approach to Kings, and principall perſons: And the raiſing of a mans owne Fortunes. Hee that hath the beſt of theſe intentions when he aſpireth, is an honeſt man: & that Prince that can diſcerne of theſe intentions in another that aſpireth, is a wiſe Prince. Generally, let Princes and States chuſe ſuch Miniſters, as are more ſenſible of duty, then of riſing, and ſuch as loue buſineſſe rather vpon conſcience then vpon brauery: and let them diſcerne a buſie nature, from a willing mind.

23. *Of Young Men and Age.*

A Man that is young in yeeres, may bee olde in houres: if hee haue loſt no time. But that hapneth rarely. Generally Youth is like the firſt cogitations, not ſo wiſe as the ſecond: For there is a Youth in thoughts, as well as in Ages. Natures that haue much heat, and great and violent deſires and perturbations, are not ripe for action, till they haue paſſed the Meridian of their yeeres: but repoſed Natures may do well in Youth: as on the other ſide, heate and viuacitie in Age is an excellent compoſition for buſineſſe. *Young Men* are fitter to inuent, then to judge: fitter for execution then for Counſell: and fitter for new projects, then for ſettled buſineſſe. For the experience of Age in thinges that fall within the compaſſe of it, directeth them: but in things meerely new, abuſeth them. The errours of young men are the ruine of buſineſſe: But the errours of Aged Men, amount but to this, that more might haue beene done, or ſooner. Young Men in the conduct and

and manage of Actions, embrace more then they can hold, ſtirre more then they can quiet, flie to the end, without conſideration of the meanes and degrees, purſue ſome fewe principles, which they haue chanced vpon abſurdly, care not to innouate, which drawes vnknowen inconueniences: vſe extreame remedies at firſt: and that which doubleth all errors, will not acknowledge nor retract them, like an vnready Horſe, that will neither ſtop nor turne. Men of age, obiect too much, conſult too long, aduenture too litle, repent too ſoone, and ſeldome driue buſines home to the full period: but content themſelues with a mediocritie of ſucceſſe. Certainly it is good to compound imployments of both: for that will be good for the preſent: becauſe the vertues of either Age may correct the defects of both: and good for ſucceſsion, that young men may be learners, while men in age are Actors: and laſtly, in reſpect of extreame accidents, becauſe authoritie followeth old men, and fauour and popularity youth. But for the morall part: perhaps youth will haue the preheminence, as age hath for the Politike. A certaine *Rabby* vpon the Text, *Your Young Men ſhall ſee Viſions, and your old Men ſhall dreame Dreames*, inferreth

ferreth, that yong men are admitted neerer to God then Old, becauſe Viſion is a cleerer Reuelation, then a Dreame. And certainely, the more a man drinketh of the World, the more it intoxicateth, and Age doth profit rather in the powers of vnderſtanding, then in the vertues of the wil and affections.

24. *Of Beautie.*

VErtue is like a rich ſtone, beſt plaine ſet: and ſurely vertue is beſt ſet in a body that is comely, though not of delicate features: and that hath rather dignity of preſence, then Beauty of reſpect. Neither is it almoſt ſeene, that very beautifull perſons are otherwiſe of great vertue: as if nature were rather buſie not to erre, then in labour to produce excellencie. And therefore they proue accompliſhed but not of great Spirit, and ſtudy rather behauiour then vertue. In *Beauty*, that of fauour is more then that of colour: and that of decent and gratious motion, more then that of fauour. That is the beſt part of beauty which a Picture cannot expreſſe: no nor the

firſt

firſt ſight of the life : and there is no excellent beauty, that hath not ſome ſtrangnes in the proportions. A man cannot tell whether *Apelles* or *Albert Durere* were the more Trifler. Whereof the one would make a perſonage by Geometrical proportions, the other, by taking the beſt parts out of diuers faces, to make one excellent. Such perſonages I thinke would pleaſe no body but the Painter that made them. Not but I thinke a Painter may make a better Face then euer was: but he muſt doe it by a kind of felicitie (as a Muſitian that maketh an excellent ayre in *Muſicke*) and not by rule. If it be true that the principall part of Beauty is in decent motion: certainly it is no maruell, though perſons in yeeres ſeeme many times more amiable, *Pulchorum Autumnus pulcher.* For no youth can be comely, but by pardon, and conſidering the youth, as to make vp the comlineſſe. Beauty is as Summer Fruits, which are eaſie to corrupt, and cannot laſt: and for the moſt part, it makes a diſſolute youth, and an age a little out of countenance: But yet certainly againe, if it light well, it maketh vertues ſhine, and vices bluſh.

25. *Of Deformity.*

DEformed perſons are commonly euen with nature: for as nature hath done ill by them, ſo do they by Nature, being for the moſt part (as the Scripture ſaith) void of naturall affection: and ſo they haue their reuenge of Nature. Certainly, there is a conſent betweene the body and the mind, and where nature erreth in the one, ſhe ventureth in the other. *Vbi peccat in vno periclitatur in altero.* But becauſe there is in man an election touching the frame of his mind, & a neceſsity in the frame of his body: the Starres of naturall inclination, are ſometimes obſcured by the Sunne of diſcipline and vertue. Therfore it is good to conſider of Deformity, not as a ſigne, which is more deceiueable: but as a cauſe, which ſeldome faileth of the effect. Whoſoeuer hath any thing fixed in his perſon, that doth induce contempt, hath alſo a perpetuall Spurre in himſelfe, to reſcue and deliuer himſelf from ſcorne. Therfore all deformed perſons are extreame bold: firſt, as in their owne defence, as being expoſed to ſcorne: but

but in proceſſe of time, by a generall habite. Alſo it ſtirreth in them induſtry, and ſpecially of this kind, to watch and obſerue the weakeneſſe of others, that they may haue ſomewhat to repay. Againe, in their ſuperiours, it quencheth ielouſie towards them, as perſons that they thinke they may at pleaſure deſpiſe: and it layeth their competitors and emulators aſleepe: as neuer beleeuing they ſhould be in poſsibility of aduancement, till they ſee them in poſſeſsion. So that vpon the whole matter, in a great wit, Deformity is an aduantage to riſing. Kings in ancient times, and at this preſent in ſome Countries, were wont to put great truſt in Eunuches: becauſe they that are enuious towards all, are more obnoxious and officious towards one. But yet their truſt towards them, hath rather beene as to good ſpials, and good whiſperers, then good Magiſtrates, and Officers. And much like is the reaſon of deformed perſons. Still the ground is, they will, if they be of ſpirit, ſeeke to free themſelues from ſcorne: which muſt be either by vertue, or malice: and therefore they proue either the beſt of men, or the worſt, or ſtrangely mixed.

26. Of Nature in Men.

NAture is often hidden, ſometimes ouercome: ſeldome extinguiſhed. Force maketh Nature more violent in the returne: Doctrine and diſcourſe maketh Nature leſſe importune: but cuſtome onely doth alter and ſubdue Nature. Hee that ſeeketh victory ouer his Nature, let him not ſet himſelfe to great, nor to ſmall taskes. For the firſt will make him deiected by often ſailes: and the ſecond will make him a ſmall proceeder, though by often preuailings. And at the firſt let him practiſe with helpes as Swimmers doe with Bladders, or Ruſhes: but after a time let him practiſe with diſaduantages, as Dauncers doe with thicke ſhooes. For it breedes great perfection, if the practiſe bee harder then the vſe. Where nature is mighty, and therefore the victory hard, the degrees had need be, firſt to ſtay and arreſt Nature in time: like to him that would ſay ouer the foure & twenty Letters when he was angry, then to go leſſe in quantity: as if one ſhould in forbearing

bearing Wine coneſrom drinking healths, to a draught a meale: and laſtly, to diſcontinue altogether. But if a man haue the fortitude and reſolution to infranchiſe himſelfe at once, that is the beſt:

Optimus ille animi vindex laedentia pectus
Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque ſemel.

Neither is the ancient rule amiſſe, to bend nature as a wand, to a contrary extreame, wherby to ſet it right: vnderſtanding it, where the cõtrary extreame is no vice. Let not a mã force a habite vpon himſelfe with a perpetuall continuance, but with ſome intermiſsion. For both the pauſe re-inforceth the new onſet: and if a man that is not perfect bee euer in practiſe, he ſhall as well practiſe his errours, as his abilities, and induce one habite of both: and there is no meanes to help this but by ſeaſonable intermiſsions. A mans nature is beſt perceiued in priuatneſſe, for there is no affectation in paſsion, for that putteth a man out of his precepts: and in a new caſe, or experiment, for there cuſtome leaueth him. They are happie men, whoſe Natures ſort with their vocations, otherwiſe they may ſay, *Multũ incola fuit anima mea,*

mea, when they conuerse in those things they doe not affect. In studies whatsoeuer a man commaundeth vpon himselfe, let him set houres for it., But whatsoeuer is agreeable to his nature, let him take no care for any set times: For his thoughts wil flie to it of themselues, so as the spaces of other businesse or studies will suffice.

27. Of Custome and Education.

MEns thoughts are much according to their inclination: their discourse and speeches according to their learning, and infused opinions: But their deeds are after as they haue bene accustomed. And therfore as *Machiauel* well noteth (though in an euil fauoured instance) there is no trusting to the force of Nature: nor to the brauery of words, except it bee corroborate by custome. His instance is, that for the atchieuing of a desperate conspiracie a man should not rest vpon the fiercenesse of any mans nature, or his resolute vndertakings, but take such a one as hath had his hands formerly in blood. But *Machiauel* knew

his hands formerly in blood. But *Machiauel* knew not of a Frier *Clement*, nor a *Ranillac*, nor a *Iaureguy*, nor a *Baltazar Gerard*. Yet his rule holdeth ſtill, that nature, nor the ingagement of words are not ſo forcible as cuſtome. Onely Superſtition is now ſo well aduanced, that men of the firſt blood are as firme a Butchers by occupation: and votarie reſolution is made equipollent to cuſtome, euen in matter of blood. In other things the predominancy of cuſtome is euery where viſible: in ſo much as a man would wonder to heare mē profeſs, proteſt, ingage, giue great words, & thē do iuſt, as they haue done before: as if they were dead Images & Engins moued only by the wheels of cuſtom. Therfore ſince cuſtom is the principal Magiſtrate of mens life, let men by all meanes endeauour to obtaine good Cuſtomes. Certainely Cuſtome is moſt perfect when it beginneth in young yeeres. This we call *Education*: which is nothing but an early Cuſtome. For it is true, that late learners cannot ſo well take the plie: except it bee in ſome mindes, that haue not ſuffered themſelues to fixe, but haue kept themſelues open and prepared to receiue continuall amendment: which is exceeding rare. But if the

orce of Cuſtome ſimple,& ſeparat be great he force of Cuſtome copulate and conioyned,and in troupe,is farre greater.For their example teacheth, company comforteth, emulation quickneth: Glory raiſeth: ſo as in ſuch places the force of Cuſtome is in his exaltation. Certainly the great multiplication of Vertues vpon humane nature, reſteth vpon ſocieties well ordained and Diſciplined. For Commonweales and good gouernments,do nouriſh vertue growne,but doe not mend the ſeeds. But the miſerie is, that the moſt effectuall meanes are now applied to the ends leaſt to be deſired.

28. *Of Fortune.*

IT cannot bee denied, but outward accidents conduce much to a mans Fortune. Fauour, Oportune Death of others: occaſion fitting vertue, But chiefely the mould of a mans Fortune is in himſelfe. And the moſt frequent of externall cauſes is,that the folly of one man is the Fortune of another. For no man proſpers

spers so suddenly, as by others errors. *Serpens nisi serpentem comederit non fit Draco.* Ouert, & apparant vertues bring forth praise, but there be hidden and secret vertues that bring forth Fortune. Certaine deliueries of a mans selfe, which haue no name. The Spanish word *Desemboltura* partly expresseth them when there be no stonds nor restiueneſse in a mans Nature. For so saith *Liuie* well, after he had described *Cato Maior* in these words: *In illo viro tantum robur corporis & animi fuit, vt quocunque loco natus esset fortunam sibi facturus videretur*: He falleth vpon that, that he had *Versatile ingenium.* Therefore if a man looke sharply and accentiuely, he shall see fortune: for though she be blind, yet she is not inuisible. The way of fortune is like the milken way in the skie, which is a meeting, or knot of a number of small Stars, not seene asunder, but giuing light together. So are there a number of litle & scarce discerned vertues, or rather faculties and Customes, that make men fortunate. The *Italians* note some of them, such as a man would little thinke, when they speake of one that cannot doe amisse, they will throw in into his other conditions, that he hath *Poco dimatto.* And certainely, there bee

not two more fortunate properties, then to haue a litle of the foole, and not too much of the honeſt. Therefore extreame louers of their Country, or Maſters, were neuer fortunate, neither can they be. For when a man placeth his thoughts without himſelfe, hee goeth not his owne way. An haſty fortune maketh an enterpriſer and remouer: (the *French* hath it better *Interprenant*, or *Remuant*) but the exerciſed fortune maketh the able man. Fortune is to be honoured and reſpected and it be but for her daughteres, *Confidence* and *Reputation*: for thoſe two felicitie breedeth: the firſt, within a mans ſelfe: the latter, in others towards him. All wiſe men to decline the Enuy of their own vertues, vſe to aſcribe them to prouidence, and Fortuue. For ſo they may the better aſſume them. And beſides, it is greatneſſe in a man to bee the care of the higher powers. And it hath bene noted, that thoſe that aſcribe openly too much to their owne wiſedome and policy, end infortunate. It is written, that *Timotheus* the *Athenian*, after hee had in the account hee gaue to the ſtate of his gouernement, often interlaced this ſpeech: *And in this, Fortune had no part*: neuer proſpered in any thing he vndertooke afterwards.

29. *Of Studies.*

STudies ſerue for Delight, for Ornamẽt, and for Ability: their chiefe vſe for delight, is in priuatnes, & retiring: for Ornament, is in diſcourſe and for Ability, is in iudgement. For expert men can execute, but learned men are fitteſt to iudge or cenſure. To ſpend too much time in them is *Sloth*: to vſe them too much for ornament, is *Affectation*, to make iudgement wholly by the r rules, is the *Humor of a Scholler*. They perfect *Nature*, and are perfected by Experience. Crafty men contemne them, ſimple men admire them, and wiſe men vſe them. For they teach not their owne vſe, but that is a wiſedome without them, and aboue them, wonne by obſeruation. Read not to contradict, nor to beleeue, but to weigh and conſider. Some Bookes are to be taſted, others to be ſwallowed, and ſome few to be chewed and digeſted. That is, ſome Bookes are to be read only in parts: other to be read, but not curiouſly: and ſome few to be read wholy & with diligence & attention. Reading maketh a ful man, Confe-

rence a ready man, & writing an exact Man. And therefore if a man write little, he had neede haue a great memorie: if he conferre little, he had neede haue a present wit: and if he reade little, he had neede haue much cunning to seeme to know that he doth not. *Histories* make men wise, *Poets* wittie, the *Mathematickes* subtill, Naturall *Philosophie* deepe, *Morall* Graue, *Logicke* and *Rhetoricke* able to contend. *Abeunt studia in mores* Nay, there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out by fit Studies: like as diseases of the body may bee appropriate exercises. Bowling is good for the stone and Raines: Shooting for the Lunges and Breast: gentle walking for the stomacke: riding for the head: and the like. So if a mans wit be wandring, let him study the Mathmatickes: if his wit be not apt to distinguish, or find difference, let him study the Schoole-men: if it bee not apt to beat ouer matters, and to finde out resemblances, let him study Lawyers cases. So euery defect of the minde may haue speciall receit.

30. *Of Ceremonies and Reſpects.*

HE that is onely reall, had need haue exceeding great partes of Vertue: as the ſtone had needs to bee rich that is ſet without foile. But commonly it is in Praiſe, as it is in gaine: For as the Prouerbe is true, *That light gaines make heauie Purſes*, beauſe they come thicke, whereas great come but now and then: ſo it is true, that ſmall matters winne great commendation, becauſe they are continually in vſe, and in note. Whereas the occaſion of any great vertue, commeth but on holy dayes. To attaine good formes, it ſufficeth not to diſpiſe them: for ſo ſhall a man obſerue them in others: And let him truſt himſelfe with the reſt. For if he care to expreſſe them, he ſhall loſe their grace, which is to be naturall and vnaffected. Some mens behauiour is like a verſe, wherein euery ſillable is meaſured: how can a man comprehend great matters, that breaketh his mind too much to ſmall obſeruation? Not to

vse Ceremonies at all, is to teach others not to vse them againe, and so diminisheth respect: especiall they be not to be omitted to strangers and formall Natures. Amongst a mans Peeres, a man shall be sure of familiaritie and therefore it is good a litle to keepe state: amongst a mans inferiours one shalbe sure of Reuerence: and therefore it is good a litle to be familiar. He that is too much in any thing, so that he giueth another occasion of saciety maketh himself cheape To apply ones self to others is good, so it be with demonstration that a man doth it vpon regard and not vpon facility. It is a good precept, generally in seconding another. Yet to adde somewhat of ones owne: as if you will grant his opinion, let it be with some distinction: if you will follow his motion, let it be with condition: if you allow his counsell let it be with alleadging further reason. Men had need beware how they be to perfite in complements. For be they neuer so sufficient otherwise, their Enuyers will be sure to giue them that attribute to the disaduantage of their greater vertue. It is losse also in busines to be too ful of respects, or to be too curious in obseruing times & oportunities. *Salomon* saith, *He that considereth the wind shall not sow, and he that looketh to the Clouds shall not*

reape. A wiſe man will make more opportunities then he findes.

31. *Of Suters.*

MAny ill matters are vndertaken, and many good matters with ill minds. Some embrace ſuits which neuer meane to deale effectually in them, but if they ſee there may be liſe in the matter by ſome other meane, they will bee content to winne a thanke, or take a ſecond reward, or at leaſt to make vſe in the meane time of the Suters hope. Some take holde of ſuits onely for an occaſion to croſſe ſome other, or to make an Information whereof they could not other-wiſe haue apt pretext, without care what become of the ſuit when that turne is ſerued. Nay, ſome vndertake ſuits with a full purpoſe to let them fall, to the end to gratifie the adverſe party or competitor. Surely there is in ſort a right in euery ſuit, either a right of equity, if it be a ſuit of controuerſie, or right of deſart, if it bee a ſuit of petition. *If affection lead a man to* fauour the wrong ſide in Iuſtice, let him rather vſe his countenance to compound the matter then to carrie it. If affection lead a man to fauour the leſſe worthy in deſart, let him

him doe it without depraying or disabling the better deseruer. In suits a man doth not well vnderstand, it is good to referre them to some friend of trust and judgement, that may report whether hee may deale in them with honor. Suters are so distasted with delayes and abuses, that plaine dealing in denying to deale in suits at first, and reporting the successe barely, and in challenging no more thankes then one hath deserued, is growne not only honourable, but also gracious. In suits of fauour, the first comming ought to take litle place: so farre forth consideration may be had of his trust, that if intelligence of the matter could not otherwise haue beene had, but by him, aduantage bee not taken of the note, but the party left to his other meanes. To be ignorant of the value of a suit is simplicity, as well as to be ignorant of the right therof, is want of cõscience. Secretsie in suits is a great meane of obtaining: For voycing them to be in forwardnesse, may discourage some kind of Suters, but doth quicken and awake others. But timing of the suits is the principall. Timing I say, not onely in respect of the person that should grant it, but in respect of those which are like to crosse it. Let a man in the choise of his

his meane, rather chuſe the fitteſt meane, thē the greateſt meane, & rather them that deale in certaine things, then thoſe that are generall. The reparation of a deniall, is ſometimes equall to the firſt graunt, if a man ſhew himſelfe neither dejected, nor diſcōtented, *Inquū petas ut æquū feras*, is a good rule where a man hath ſtrength of fauor, but otherwiſe a man were better riſe in his ſuit: for he that would haue ventured at firſt to haue loſt the Suter, will not in the concluſion, loſe both the Suter and his owne former fauour. Nothing is thought ſo eaſie a requeſt to a great perſon as his Letter, and yet if it be not in a good cauſe, it is ſo much out of his reputation.

33. *Of Followers and Friends.*

COſtly Followers are not to be liked, leſt while a man maketh his traine longer, he make his Wings ſhorter. I reckon to be coſtly, not them alone, which charge the purſe. but which are wearieſome & importune in ſuits. Ordinary followers ought to challenge no higher conditions then

then countenance, recommendation, and protection from wrongs. Factious Followers are worse to be liked, which follow not vpon affectiō to him with whom they range themselues, but vpon discontentment conceiued against some other. Wherupō commonly ensueth, that il intelligence, that we many times see betweene great personages. Likewise glorious Followers are full of inconuenience, for they teint businesse through want of secrecy, & they export honour from a man, and make him a returne in enuy. The following by certaine States, answerable to that which a great person himselfe professeth, as of Souldiers to him that hath bene imployed in the warres, and the like, hath euer bin a thing ciuill, and well taken euen in Monarchies, so it be without too much pompe or popularity. But the most honourable kind of following, is to be followed, as one that apprehendeth to aduance vertue and desart in all sort of persons. And yet where there is no eminent oddes in sufficiency, it is better to take with the more passable, thē with the more able. In gouernement it is good to vse men of one ranke equally: For to countenance some extraordinarily, is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent, because

becauſe they may claime a due. But in fauour to vſe men with much difference and election, is good: For it maketh the perſons preferred more thankfull, and the reſt more officious, becauſe all is of fauour. It is good not to make too much of any man at the firſt, becauſe one cannot hold out that proportiõ. To be gouerned by one is not good, and to be diſtracted with many, is worſe: but to take aduiſe of ſome fewe friends, is euer honourable: *For lookers on, many times ſee more then Gameſters, and the vale beſt diſcouereth the hill.* There is litle friendſhip in the world, & leaſt of all betweene equalls, which was wont to be magnified. That that is, is betweene *Superior* and *Inferior*, whoſe fortunes may comprehend the one the other.

33. *Of Negotiating.*

IT is generally better to deale by ſpeech, then by letter, and by the meditation of a third, then by a mans ſelfe. Letters are good, when a man would draw an anſwere by Letter backe againe, or when it may

may ſerue for a mans juſtification afterwards to produce his owne letter, or where it may be danger to bee interrupted or heard by peeces. To deale in perſon is good, when a mans face breedes regard, as cõmonly with inferiours, or in tender caſes where a mans eye vpõ the countenance of him with whom one ſpeaketh, may giue him a direction how farre to goe, and generally where a man will reſerue to himſelfe liberty either to diſauow, or to expound. In choiſe of inſtruments it is better to chuſe men of a plainer ſort, that are like to do that that is committed to them, and to report backe againe faithfully the ſucceſſe, then thoſe that are cunning to contriue out of other mens buſineſſe, ſomewhat to grace themſelues, and wil helpe the matter in report for ſatisfaction ſake. It is better to ſound a perſon with whome one deales afar off, then to fall vpon the point at firſt, except you meane to ſurpriſe him by ſome ſhort queſtiõ. It is better dealing with men in appetite, then with thoſe which are where they would be. If a man deale with another vpon conditions, the ſtart or firſt performance is all, which a man cannot reaſonably demand, except either the nature of the thing bee ſuch which muſt go before, or

elſe

elſe a man can perſwade the other party, that hee ſhall ſtill neede him in ſome other thing, or elſe that he be coũted the honeſter man. All practiſe is to diſcouer, or to worke. Men diſcouer themſelues in truſt, in paſſiõ, at vnawares, & of neceſſity, when they wold haue ſome-what done, & cannot find an apt pretext. If you would worke any man, you muſt either know his nature & faſhions, & ſo lead him, or his ends, & ſo perſwade him, or his weakneſſe or diſaduantage, & ſo aw him, or thoſe that haue intereſt in him, and ſo gouerue them. In dealing with cunning perſõs, wee muſt euer conſider their endes to interpret their ſpeeches: & it is good to ſay little to them, & that which they leaſt looke for.

34. *Of Faction.*

MAny haue an opiniõ not wiſe, That for a Prince to gouerne his eſtate, or for a great perſon to gouerne his proceedings, according to the reſpect of Factions, is the principall part of policy: whereas contrariwiſe, the chiefeſt wiſedome is either in ordering thoſe things which are generall, and wherein men of ſeuerall factions doe neuertheleſſe agree, or in dealing

dealing with correſpondence to particular perſons, one by one. But I ſay not, that the conſideratiō of Factions is to be neglected. Meane men muſt adhere, but great men that haue ſtrength in themſelues were better to maintaine themſelues indifferent, and neutrall. Yet euen in beginners to adhere ſo moderately, as he be a man of the one faction, which is paſſableſt with the other, commonly giueth beſt way. The lower and weaker factiō is the firmer in conjunction. When one of the factions is extinguiſhed, the remaining ſubdivideth, which is good for a ſecond. It is commonly ſeene, that men once placed, take in with the contrary faction to that, by which they enter. The Traitor in factions lightly goeth away with it: for when matters haue ſtucke long in balancing, the winning of ſome one man caſteth them, and he getteth all the thankes. The euen carriage betweene two factions, proceedeth not alwayes of moderation, but of a trueneſſe to a mans ſelfe, with ende to make vſe of both. Certainely, in *Italy* they holde it a litle ſuſpect in Popes, when they haue often in their mouth *Padre commune*, & take it to be a ſigne of one that meaneth to referre all to the greatneſſe of his owne houſe.

35. *Of Praiſe.*

PRaiſe is the reflexion of vertue: but it is as the glaſſe, or body is, which giueth the reflection. If it be from the common people, it is commonly falſe and naught, and rather followeth vaine perſons, then vertuous: for the cómmon people vnderſtand not many excellent vertues: the loweſt vertues draw praiſe from them, the middle vertues worke in them aſtoniſhment, or admiration, but of the higheſt vertues, they haue no ſenſe nor perceiuing at all. But ſhewes, and *Species virtutibus ſimiles*, ſerue beſt with them. Certainely, Fame is like a Riuer that beareth vp things light and ſwolne, and drowne things weighty and ſolide: But if perſons of quality and iudgement concurre, then it is as the Scripture ſaith: *Nomen bonum inſtar unguenti fragrantis*: It filleth all round about, and will not eaſily away. For the odours of oyntments are more durable then thoſe of flowres. There be ſo many falſe points of praiſe, that a man may iuſtly holde it ſuſpect. Some praiſes proceedes meerely of flattery: and if

he be an ordinary flatterer, he will haue certaine common attributes which may ſerue euery man: if hee be a cunning flatterer, hee wil follow the Archflatterer, which is a mans ſelfe, and wherein a man thinketh beſt of himſelfe, therein the flatterer will vpholde him moſt: But if he be an impudent Flatterer, looke wherin a man is conſcient to himſelfe, that hee is moſt defectiue, and is moſt out of countenance in himſelfe, that wil the flatterer entitle him to perforce, *Spreta conſcientiâ.* Some praiſes come of good wiſhes, & reſpects, which is a forme due in ciuilitie to Kings and great perſons, *Laudando præcipere*: when by telling men what they are, they repreſent to them what they ſhould be. Some men are praiſed maliciouſly to their hurt, thereby to ſtirre enuy and jealouſie towards them, *Peſſimum genus inimicorum laudantium.* Certainly moderate praiſe vſed with opportunity, & not vulgar, but appropriat, is that which doth the good. *Salomon* ſaith, *Hee that praiſeth his Friend aloud, riſing early, it ſhal be to him no better then a curſe.* Too much magnifying of man or matter, doth irritate contradiction, and procure enuy and ſcorne.

36. Of Iudicature.

IVdges ought to remember, that their Office is *Ius dicere*, and not *Ius dare*, to interpret law, and not to make law, or giue law: Elſe wil it be like the preſumption of the church of *Rome*, which vnder pretext of expoſition of Scripture, vſurpeth and practiſeth an authority to adde & alter & to pronounce that which they do not find and by colour of antiquity to introduce nouelty. Iudges ought to be more learned then witty, more reuerend then plauſible, and more aduiſed then confident Aboue all things, integrity is their portion & proper vertue. *Curſed* (ſaith the Law) *is he that remoueth the Lande marke.* The miſlayer of a Meereſtone is too blaine, But it is the vnjuſt Iudge that is the capital remouer of Landmarkes, whē he defineth amiſſe of lands & property. One foule ſentence doth more hurt, then many foule examples, for they doe but corrupt the ſtreame: the other corrupteth the Fountaine. So ſaith *Salomon*: *Fons turbatus & vena corrupta eſt iuſtus cadens in cauſa ſua*

coram aduersario : The office of Iudges may haue reference vnto the parties that sue, vnto the Aduocats that plead, vnto the Clarks and Ministers of Iustice vnderneth them, and to the Soueraigne or state aboue them.

There be (saith the Scripture) *that turne Iudgement into Worme-Wood*, and surely there be also that turne it into vinegar: For Injustice maketh it bitter, and delayes makes it sowre. The principall duty of a Iudge, is to suppresse force and fraud, whereof force is the more pernitious, the more open, and fraud the more close & disguised. Adde thereto cõtentious suits, which ought to be spewed out as the surfeit of Courts. A Iudge ought to prepare his way to a just sentence, as God vseth to prepare his way, by raising vallies, & taking downe hils: So when there appeareth on either side an high hand, violent prosecution, cunning aduantages taken, combination, power, great counsell, then is the vertue of a Iudge seene, to make inequality equall, that he may plant his Iudgement as vpon an euen ground. *Qui fortiter emungit, elicit sanguinem* : And where the Wine presse is hard wrought, it yeelds a harsh Wine, that tasts of the Grapestone. Iudges must beware of hard constructions & stained inferences,

for

for there is no worſe torture then the torture of lawes: ſpecially in caſe of lawes penall, they ought to haue care that that which was meant for terror, be not turned into rigor, & that they bring not vpon the people that ſhowre whereof the Scripture ſpeaketh, *Pluet ſuper eos laqueos*: For penall lawes preſſed, are a ſhowre of ſnares vpon the people. In cauſes of life & death, Iudges ought as farre (as the law permitteth) in Iuſtice to remember mercy, and to caſt a ſeuere eye vpon the example: but a mercifull eye vpon the perſon.

Patience and grauity of hearing is an eſſential part of Iuſtice, and an ouer-ſpeaking Iudge is no well tuned Cymbal. It is no grace to a Iudge, firſt to finde that which he might haue heard in due time from the Barre, or to ſhew quicknes of conceit in cutting off counſell, or euidence too ſhort, or to preuent information by queſtions, though pertinent. The parts of a Iudge are foure, to direct the euidence, to moderate length, repetition or impertinency of ſpeech, to recapitulat ſelect, & collate the materiall points of that which hath bene ſaide, and to giue the rule or ſentence. Whatſoeuer is aboue theſe, is too much, and proceedeth either of glory and willingneſſe to ſpeake, or of impatience to

hear, or of shortnes of memory, or of want of a staid & equal attention. It is a strange thing to see, that the boldnes of Aduocates should preuaile with Iudges, whereas they should imitate God, in whose seat they sit, who represseth the presumptuous, and giueth grace to the Modest. But it is more strange, that the custome of the time doth warrant Iudges to haue noted fauourites, which cannot but cause multiplication of Fees, & suspition of by-waies. There is due from the Iudge to the Aduocate some commendation & gracing, where causes are well handled, & faire pleaded: especially towardes the side which obtaineth not: For that vpholdes in the Client the reputation of his Councel, & beats down in him the conceit of his cause. There is likewise due to the publike a ciuill reprehension of Aduocats, where there appeareth cunning Councell, grosse neglect, slight information, indiscreet pressing, or an ouer bold defence.

The place of Iustice is an hallowned place: and therefore, not onely the bench, but the foot-pace and precincts, & purprise thereof, ought to be preserued without scandall and corruption. For certainely *Grapes* (as the Scripture saith) *will not be gathered of Thornes or Thistles*, neither can Iustice yeeld her fruit with

with ſweetnes, amongſt the Briers & Brambles of catching & polling Clarkes & Miniſters. The attendance of Courts is ſubject to four bad Inſtruments: Firſt, certain perſons, that are ſowers of ſuites, which make the Court ſwell, & the Country pine. The ſecond ſort is of thoſe that engage Courts in quarrels of Iuriſdiction, & are not truely *Amici Curiæ*, but *Paraſiti Curiæ*, in puffing a Court vp beyond her bounds for their own ſcraps & aduantage. The third ſort is of thoſe, that may be accounted the left handes of Courts, perſons that are full of nimble and ſiniſter Trickes and ſhifts whereby they peruert the plain & direct courſes of Courts, & bring Iuſtice into oblike lines & labyrinths. And the fourth is the Poler & exacter of Fees, which juſtifies the common reſemblance of the Courtes of Iuſtice, to the buſh, whereunto while the ſheepe flyes for defence in weather, he is ſure to loſe part of his fleece. On the other ſide, an ancient Clarke, skilfull in preſidents, wary in proceeding, & vnderſtanding in the buſines of the Court, is an excellent finger of a Court, & doth many times point the way to the Iudge himſelfe.

¶ Laſtly, Iudges ought aboue all to remēber the cōcluſion of the Romane twelue Tables,

Salus populi suprema lex, & to know that lawes, except they be in order to that end, are but things captious, & oracles not well inspired. Therfore it is an happy thing in a State, whē Kings & States doe often consult with Iudges, and againe, when Iudges do often consult with the King and State: the one, when there is matter of Law interuenient in busines of State, the other, when there is some cōsideration of State interuenient in matter of law. For many times the thing deduced to Iudgement may be *Meum & tuum*, when the reason & consequence thereof may trench to point of estate. I cal matter of estate not only the partes of Soueraignity, but whatsoeuer introduceth any great alteration or dangerous president, or concerneth manifestly any great portion of people. And let no man weakly conceiue, that just lawes & true policy, haue any antipathy. For they are like the spirits, & sinewes that one moues within the other. Neither ought Iudges to be so ignorant of their own right, as to thinke there is not left to them as a principal part of their office, a wise vse & application of lawes. For, they may remēber what the Apostle saith of a greater law then theirs, *Nos scimus, quia lex bona est, modo quis ea utatur legitime.*

37. *Of Vaine-glory.*

IT was prettily deuiſed of *Æſop*, *The Flie ſate vpon the Axletree of the Chariot Wheele, and ſaid, What a duſt doe I raiſe?* So are there ſome vaine perſons, that whatſoeuer goeth alone, or mooues vpon greater meanes, they thinke it is they that carry it. They that are glorious, muſt needs be factious: for all brauery ſtands vpon cõpariſons. They muſt needs be violent, to make good their owne vaunts. Neither can they bee ſecret, & therfore not effectual but according vnto the *French* Prouerbe, *Beaucoup de bruit & peu de fruit*, Much bruit, litle fruit. Yet certainely, there is vſe of this qualitie in ciuill affaires. Where there is an opinion and fame to be created, either of *Vertue* or *Greatneſſe*: theſe men are good Trumpeters. Againe, as *Titus Liuius* noteth in the caſe of *Antiochus* and the *Ætolians*, *There are ſometimes great effects of croſſe lies*: as if a man that ſhould interpoſe himſelfe to negotiate betweene two, ſhould to either of them ſeuerally pretend, more intereſt then he hath in the other. And in this and the like kind, it often

often fals out, that somwhat is produced of nothing. For lies are sufficient to breed Opinion, and Opinion brings on Substance. But principally in cases of great enterprise, vpon charge and aduenture such composition of glorious natures doth put life into busines, and those that are of solid and sober natures haue more of the ballast, then of the saile. Certainly, *Vaine-glory* helpeth to perpetuate a mans memory, and *Vertue* was neuer so beholding to humane nature as it receiued his due at the second hand. Neither had the fame of *Cicero*, *Seneca*, *Plinius Secundus*, borne her age so well, if it had not bene ioyned with some vanity in themselues: like vnto varnish, that makes Seelings not onely shine, but last. But all this while, when I speake of Vaine-glory, I meane not of that property that *Tacitus* doth attribute to *Mucianus*, *Omnium quæ dixerat fecerat quæ arte quadam ostentator*: For that proceeds not of Vanity, but of naturall magnanimity and discretion: and in some persons is not only comely, but gracious. For excusations, cessions, modesty it selfe well gouerned, are but Arts of ostenstation: and amongst those Arts there is none better, then that which *Plinius Secundus* speaketh of, which is to bee liberall

liberall of praiſe and commendation to others, in that wherein a mans ſelfe hath any perfection. For ſaith *Plinie* very wittily: *In commending another you doe your ſelfe right: for he that you commend, is either ſuperiour to you, in that you commend, or inferiour. If hee bee inferiour, if hee bee to bee commended, you much more: if he be ſuperiour, if he be not to be commended, you much leſſe.*

38. *Of the Greatneſſe of Kingdomes.*

THe ſpeech of *Themiſtocles*, which was arrogant in challenge, is profitable in Cenſure. Deſired at a Banquet to touch a Lute, hee ſaide, *Hee could not fiddle, but he could make a ſmall Towne to become a great Citie.* The ſpeech, at a time of ſolace and not ſerious, was vnciuill, & at no time could be decent of a mans ſelf. But it may haue a pretty application. For to ſpeake truely of politickes and Stateſmen, there are ſometimes, though rarely, thoſe that can make a ſmall eſtate great, and cannot

cannot fiddle. And there be many that can Fiddle very cunningly, and yet the procedure of their Art, is to make a flouriſhing eſtate ruinous and diſtreſſed. For certainely thoſe degenerate Arts, whereby diuers Politickes and Gouernours do gaine both ſatisfaction with their Maſters, and admiration with the vulgar, deſerue no better name then Fidling: if they adde nothing to the ſafety, ſtrength, and amplitude of the ſtates they gouerne. The greatneſſe of a State in bulke or Territory, doth fall vnder meaſure, and the greatneſſe of finances and reuenue, doth fall vnder computation: the population may appeare by muſters, and the number of Cities and Townes, by Charets and Maps: but yet there is nothing amongſt ciuil affaires, more ſubiect to error, then the right valuation & true iudgement concerning the greatnes of an eſtate. Certainly there is a kind of reſemblance betweene the kingdome of heauen, and the Kingdomes vpon the earth. The Kingdome of Heauen is compared not to any great Kernell or Nut, but to a graine of Muſtard, which is one of the leaſt of Graines, but hath in it a property and ſpirit haſtily to get vp and ſpread. So are there States that are great in Territorie, & yet not apt

apt to conquer or inlarge: and others, that haue but a ſmall dimention or ſtemme, and yet apt to be the foundation of great Monarchies. Walled Townes, ſtored Arcenals and Armories, goodly Stables, Elephants, (if you will) Maſſe of Treaſure, number in Armies, Ordinance, and Artillerie, they are all but a Sheepe in a Lyons skinne, except the breed and diſpoſition of the people be militarie. The helpe is mercenarie aides. But a Prince or State that reſteth vpon waged companies of foraine armes, and not of his owne Natiues, may ſpread his feathers for a time but he will mew them ſoone after. The bleſſing of *Iudah* & *Iſſachar* will neuer meete, to be both the Lyons Whelpe, and the Aſſe laid betweene burthens: Neither will a people ouercharged with Tributes, be euer fit for Empire. Nobility and Gentlemen multiplying in too great a portion, maketh the common Subiect grow to be a Peaſant and baſe Swaine, driuen out of heart, and but the Gentlemans labourer: like as it is in Copices, where if you leaue your Staddles too thicke, you ſhall neuer haue cleane vnderwood, but ſhrubs and buſhes, and take away the middle people, and you take away the Infantery, which is the Nerue of an Armie:

and

and you bring it to this, that not the hundreth pole will bee fit for a Helmet, and ſo great population and little ſtrength. Certainly *Virgil* coupled Armes and the Plough together well, in the conſtitution of ancient *Italie*:

Terra potens armis atquè vbere glebæ.

For it is the Plough that yeeldeth the beſt ſouldier, but how? maintained in plenty & in the hand of owners, and not of meere laborers. Sedentary and within-doore Artes, and nice manufactures, that require rather the finger, then the hand or arme, haue in their nature a contrariety to a diſpoſition militar: and generally, all warlike people are a litle ydle, and loue daunger better then paine: neither muſt they be too much broken of it, if they ſhall be preſerued in vigor. No body can be healthfull without exerciſe, neither naturall body, nor politike: and to the politike body of a kingdome or eſtate, a ciuill warre is as the heate of a feauer: but an honourable forraine warre, is like the heat of exerciſe. At leaſt, diſcoueries, Nauigations, honourable ſuccors of other States may keepe health: For in a ſlothfull peace, both courages will effeminate, and manners

corrupt.

corrupt States liberall of naturalization, are capable of greatneſſe: and the iealous States that reſt vpon the firſt tribe & ſtrip quickely want body to cary the boughes & branches. Many are the ingredients into the receit for greatneſſe. No man can by care taking, adde a cubite to his ſtature, in the little modell of a mans body. But certainely in the great frame of kingdomes & Commonwealthes, it is in the power of Princes or eſtates by ordinances and conſtitutions, and manners which they may introduce, to ſow greatneſſe to their poſteritie and ſucceſsion. But theſe things are commonly left to chance.

41. *Of Honour and Reputation,*

THe winning of Honour is but the reuealing of a mans vertue & worth without diſaduantage, for ſome in their actions doe affect Honour and Reputation, which ſort of men are commonly much talked of, but inwardly little admired: & ſome darken their vertue in the ſhew of it, ſo as they be vnder-valued in opinion.

If

If a man performe that which hath not bene attempted before, or attempted and giuen ouer, or hath bene atchieued, but not with so good circumstance, he shall purchase more honour, then by effecting a matter of greater difficulty or vertue, wherein he is but a follower. If a man so temper his actions as in some one of them he doe content euery faction or combination of people, the Musicke will be the fuller. A man is an ill husband of his honour that entreth into any action, the failing wherin may disgrace him more, then the carrying of it through, can honour him. Discreet followers help much to reputation. Enuy, which is the canker of honour, is best extinguished by declaring a mans selfe in his ends, rather to seeke merit then fame, and by attributing a mans successes rather to diuine prouidence and felicity, then to his vertue or pollicy. The true Marshalling of the degrees of Soueraigne Honour are these. In the first place, are *Conditores*, Founders of States. In the second place, are *Legislatores*, Law-giuers, which are also called, *Second Founders*, or *Perpetui Principes*, because they gouerne by their Ordinances after they are gone. In the third place, are *Liberatores*, Such as compound the long miseries of ciuill

uill warres, or deliuer their Countries from ſeruitude of ſtrangers or tyrants. In the fourth place are *propagatores*, or *propugnatores imperij*, ſuch as in honourable warres inlarge their territories, or, make noble defence againſt inuadors. And in the laſt place, are *Patres patriæ*, which raigne iuſtly, and make the times good wherein they liue. Degrees of honour in ſubiects are firſt, *Participes curarum*: Thoſe vpon whom Princes doe diſcharge the greateſt weight of their affaires, their *Right hands* (as we call them) The next, are *Duces belli*, Great leaders, ſuch as are Princes Lieutenants, and doe them notable ſeruices in the warres. The third, are *Gratioſi*, Fauourites, ſuch as exceede not this ſcantling, to be ſolace to the Soueraigne, and harmeleſſe to the people. And the fourth, *Negotij pares*, ſuch as haue great place vnder Princes, and execute their places with ſufficiencie.

FINIS

Meditationes ſacræ.

1 *OF the Workes of God and Man.*
2 *Of the Miracles of our Saviour.*
3 *Of the Innocency of the Dove, and the wiſdome of the Serpent.*
4 *Of the Exaltation of Charity.*
5 *Of the Moderation of Cares.*
6 *Of earthly Hope.*
7 *Of Hypocrites.*
8 *Of Impoſtures.*
9 *Of the ſeuerall kinds of Impoſture.*
10 *Of Atheiſme.*
11 *Of Hereſies.*
12 *Of the Church and the Scripture.*

1. *Of*

1. *Of the Workes of God and Man.*

GOD beheld all things which his hands had made, and loe they were all passing good. But when man turned him about, & tooke a view of the works which his hands had made, he found all to be vanity & vexation of spirit: wherefore, if thou shalt work in the works of God, thy sweat shalbe as an oynment of odors, & thy rest as the Sabboth of God. Thou shalt trauaile in the sweat of a good conscience, and shall keepe holy day in the quietnesse & liberty of the sweetest contemplations. But if thou shalt aspire after the glorious actes of Men, thy working shall be accompanied with compunction and strife, & thy remembrance followed with distast & vpbraidings, and iustly doth it come to passe towards thee (O man) that since thou which art Gods worke, doest him no reason in yeelding him well pleasing seruice, euen thine owne workes also should reward thee with the like fruit of bitternesse,

2. *Of the Miracles of our Saviour.*

He hath done all things well.

A True confeſsion and applauſe: God when he created all things, ſawe that euery thing in particular, and all things in generall were exceeding good, God the word in the Miracles which he wrought (now euery Miracle is a new Creation, and not according to the firſt Creation) would do nothing which breathed not towards men fauour and bounty, *Moyſes* wrought Miracles and ſcourged the *Ægyptians* with many plagues. *Elias* wrought Miracles, and ſhut vp Heauen, that no Raine ſhould fall vpon the Earth, and againe brought downe from Heauen the fire of God vpon the Captaines and their bandes. *Elizeus* wrought alſo, and called Beares out of the deſart to deuoure young Children. *Peter* ſtroke *Ananias* the ſacrilegious Hypocrite with preſent death: and *Paul*, *Elimas* the Sorcerer with blindneſſe, but no ſuch thing did Ieſus, the Spirit of God deſcended downe vpon

vpon him in the forme of a Doue, of whom he ſaid: *You know of what Spirit you are.* The Spirit of *Ieſus* is the Spirit of a Doue, thoſe Seruants of God were as the Oxen of God treading out the Corne, and trampling the Straw downe vnder their feet, but Ieſus is the Lambe of God without wrath or iudgements. All his Miracles were conſumate about mans body, as his Doctrine reſpected the ſoule of man. The body of man needeth theſe things: ſuſtenance, defence from outward wrongs,& medicine, it was he that drew a multitude of fiſhes into the nets, that he might giue vnto men more liberall prouiſion. Hee turned water a leſſe worthy nouriſhmēt of mans body,into wine, a more worthy that glads the heart of man. He ſentenced the Fig tree to wither for not doing that duty whereunto it was ordained, which is to beare fruit for mens food. He multiplied the ſcarcety of a few loaues and fiſhes to a ſufficiency to victuall an hoaſt of people. He rebuked the winds that threatned deſtruction to the Sea-faring men: he reſtored motiō to the lame, light to the blind, ſpeech to the dumb, health to the ſick, cleanneſſe to the leprous, a right mind to thoſe that were poſſeſſed,& life to the dead. No Miracle of his is

to be found to haue bene of iudgement on reuenge, but all of goodneſſe and mercy, and reſpecting mans body: for as touching Riches he did not vouchſafe to doe any Miracle, ſaue one onely that tribute might bee giuen to *Caſar*

3. *Of the Innocencie of the Doue, and Wiſedome of the Serpent.*

The Foole receiueth not the word of wiſedome, except thou diſcouer to him what he hath in his heart.

TO a Man of a peruerſe and corrupt iudgement all inſtruction or perſwaſion is fruitleſſe and contemptible which begins not with diſcouery, & laying open of the diſtemper and ill complexion of the mind, which is to be recured as a Plaiſter is vnſeaſonably applied before the wound be ſearched: for men of corrupt vnderſtanding that haue loſt all ſound diſcerning of good and euil come poſſeſt with this preiudicate opinion, that they thinke all honeſty & goodnes proceedeth out of a ſimplicity

plicity of maners, and a kind of want of experience & vnacquaintance with the affaires of the World. Therefore except they may perceiue that thoſe things which are in their hearts, that is to ſay, their own corrupt principles, and the deepeſt reaches of their cunning and rottenneſſe, to be throughly ſounded and knowen, to him that goes about to perſwade with them, they make but a play of the words of wiſdome. Therfore it behoueth him which aſpireth to a goodneſſe (not retired or particular to himſelfe, but a fructifying and begetting goodneſſe, which ſhould draw on others) to know thoſe points which he called in the reuelation the deeps of Sathan: That he may ſpeake with authority & true inſinuatiõ. Hence is the precept: *Try all things, and hold that which is good*, which indureth a diſcerning election out of an examination whence nothing at all is excluded, out of the ſame Fountaine ariſeth that direction: *Be you Wiſe as Serpents & innocent as Doues.* There are neither teeth nor ſtings, nor venime, nor wreaths, and foulds of Serpents, which ought not to be all known, & as farre as examination doth lead, tried: neither let any man here feare infection or pollution, for the Sunne entreth into ſinkes and

is not defiled. Neither let any man thinke that herein hee tempteth God, for his diligence and generality of examination is commanded, and *God is ſufficient to preſerue you immaculate and pure.*

4. *Of the Exaltation of Charitie.*

If I haue reioyced at the ouerthrow of him that hated me, or tooke pleaſure when aduerſitie did befall him.

THe deteſtation or renouncing of Iob. For a man to loue againe where hee is loued, it is the charity of Publicanes contracted by mutuall profit, and good offices, but to loue a mans enemies is one of the cunningeſt pointes of the Lawe of Chriſt, & an imitation of the diuine nature. But yet againe of this charity there be diuers degrees: whereof the firſt is, to pardon our enemies when they repent: of which Charity there is a ſhaddow and image, euen in noble beaſts: for of Lions it is a receiued opinion

opinion, that their fury and fierceneſſe ceaſeth towards any thing that yeeldeth and proſtrateth it ſelfe. The ſecond degree is, to pardon our enemies, though they perſiſt, without ſatisfactions and ſubmiſsions. The third degree is, not only to pardon and forgiue, & forbeare our enemies, but to deſerue well of them, and to do them good, but all theſe three degrees either haue or may haue in them, a certaine brauery and greatneſſe of the mind, rather then pure Charity: for when a man perceiueth vertue to flow from himſelfe, it is poſsible that he is puffed vp and takes contentment rather in the fruit of his owne vertue, then in the good of his neighbours: but if any euill ouertake the Enemy from any other Coaſt, then from thy ſelfe, and thou in the inwardeſt motions of thy heart beeſt gricued and compaſsionate, and doeſt no wayes inſult, as if thy dayes of right and reuenge were at the laſt come. This I interpret to be the height and exaltation of Charitie.

5. Of

5. Of the moderation of Cares.

Sufficient for the day is the euill thereof.

THere ought to bee a man ſure in worldly cares, otherwiſe they are both vnprofitable, as thoſe which oppreſſe the mind & aſtoniſh the iudgment, & prophane, as thoſe which ſauour of a mind, which promiſeth to it ſelfe a certain perpetuity in the thinges of this World: for we ought to be dayes-men and not to morrowes-men, conſidering the ſhortnes of our time, & as he ſaith: *Laying hold on the preſent day*, for the future things ſhall in their turnes become preſent: therefore the care of the preſent ſufficeth: & yet moderat cares (whether they concerne our particular or the Cómon-wealth, or our Friends) are not blamed. But herin is a two-fold exceſſe the one when the Chaine or Threed of our cares extended & ſpun out to an ouer great length, and vnto times too farre off, as if we could bind the diuine prouidẽce by our prouiſiõs, which

which euen with the heathen was alwayes found to be a thing insolent and vnlucky, for those which did attribute much to Fortune, and were ready at hande to apprehend with alacrity the present occasions, haue for the most part in their actions bene happy. But they who in compassing wisdome haue entred into a confidence that they had belayed all euents, haue for the most part encountred misfortune. The second excesse is, when we dwell longer in our cares, then is requisit for due deliberating, or firme resoluing: for who is there amongst vs that careth no more then sufficeth either to resolue of a course or to conclude vpon an impossibility, and doth not still chew ouer the same things, and treade a maze in the same thought, and vanisheth in them without issue or conclusion: which kind of cares are most contrary to all diuine and humane respects.

6. Of Earthly Hope.

Better is the ſight of the eye, then the apprehenſion of the mind.

PVre ſenſe receiuing euery thing, according vnto the naturall impreſſion, makes a better State and gouernment of the minde, then theſe ſame imaginations and apprehenſions of the mind: for the minde of man hath this nature and property, euē in the graueſt & moſt ſettled wits, that frō the ſenſe of euery particular, it doth as it were bound & ſpring forward, and take hold of other matters, fortelling vnto it ſelfe that all ſhall proue like vnto that which beateth vpon the preſent ſenſe: if the ſenſe be of good, it eaſily runnes into an vn-limited hope, and into a like feare: when the ſenſe is of euill, according as is ſaide,

The oracles of hopes doth oft abuſe.

And that contrary,

A froward ſuith-ſayer is feare in doubts.

But yet of feare there may be made ſome vſe, for it prepareth patience, and awaketh induſtry.

No ſhape of ill, comes new or ſtrange to me,
All ſorts ſet downe, yea and prepared be.

But

But hope seemeth a thing altogether vnprofitable, for to what end serueth this conceit of good. Consider and note a litle if the good fall out lesse then thou hopest, good though it be, yet lesse because it is, it seemeth rather losse then benefit through thy excesse of hope: if the good prooue equal & proportionable in euent to thy hope, yet the flowre thereof by thy hope is gathered, so as when it comes, the grace of it is gone, and it seemes vsed, and therefore sooner draweth on saciety: admit thy successe prooue better then thy hope, it is true a gaine seemes to be made: but had it not bene better to haue gained the principal by hoping for nothing then the increase by hoping for lesse. And this is the operation of Hope in good fortunes, but in misfortunes it weakneth all force and vigor of the minde: for neither is there alwayes matter of Hope, and if there bee, yet if it faile but in part, it doth wholly ouerthrow the constancy and resolution of the minde, and besides though it doth carry vs through, yet it is a greater Dignity of mind to beare euils by fortitude and judgement, then by a kind of absenting & alienation of the mind frō things present to things future, for that it is to hope. And therefore,

it

it was much lightnes in the Poets to faigne hope to be as a counter-poyſon of humaine diſeaſes, as to mitigate and aſſwage the fury and anger of them, whereas indeede it doth kindle and enrage them, and cauſeth both doubling of them & relapſes. Notwithſtanding we ſee that the greateſt nũber of men, giue themſelues ouer to their imaginations of hope and apprehenſions of the minde, in ſuch ſort, that vngratefull towardes things paſt, & in a maner vnmindfull of things preſent, as if they were euer Children and beginners, they are ſtill in longing for things to come. *I ſaw all Men walking vnder the Sunne, reſort and gather to the ſecond perſon, Which was afterwards to ſucceede, this is an euill diſeaſe, and a great idleneſſe of the minde.*

But perhaps you will aske the queſtion, whether it be not better when things ſtand in doubtful tearmes, to preſume the beſt, & rather hope well then diſtruſt: ſpecially ſeeing, that hope doth cauſe a greater tranquillity of minde?

Surely I do judge a ſtate of mind which in all doubtful expectations is ſettled & floteth not, & doth this out of a good gouernment and compoſition of the affections. to be one of the principall ſupportes of mans life: But that

that assurance & repose of the mind, which only rides at Ancor vpon hope, I do reject as wauering & weake, not that it is not conuenient to foresee & presuppose out of a sound & sober conjecture, aswell the good as the euill, that thereby we may fit our actions to the probabilities and likelihoods of their euent, so that this bee a worke of the vnderstanding & judgement, with a due bent and inclination of the affection: but which of you hath so kept his Hopes within limits, as when it is so, that you haue out of a watchfull & strong discourse of the mind set down the better successe to bee in apparancy the more likely, you haue not dwelt vpon the very muse & forethoght of the good to come, & giuing scope & fauour vnto your mind, to fall into such cogitations as into a pleasant dreame: & this it is which makes the minde light, frothy, vnequall & wandering: wherefore al our Hope is to be bestowed vpon the heauenly life to come. But here on the earth, the purer our sense is from the infection and tincture of imagination, the better and wiser soule.

The summe of life to litle doth amount,
And therefore doth forbid a longer count.

7. Of

7. Of Hypocrites.

I demand mercy and not sacrifice.

ALl the boasting of the Hypocrit is of the workes of the first Table of the Law, which is of adoration and duety towardes God: whereof the reason is double, both because such workes haue a greater pompe & demonstration of holines, & also because they doe lesse crosse their affections & desires, therefore the way to conuict Hypocrits, is to send them from the workes of sacrifice to the works of mercy, whence commeth that saying,

This is pure and immaculate Religion With God the Father, to visit Orphanes and Widowes in their tribulations. And that saying: *He that loueth not his Brother Whome hee hath seene, how can hee loue God whom he hath not seene.*

Now there is another kind of deeper and more extrauagant hypocrisie: for, some deceiuing themselues, & thinking themselues worthy of a more neere accesse and conuersation with God, doe neglect the duties of Charity towardes their Neighbour, as inferiour

inferiour matters, which did not indeede cause Originally the beginning of a monastical life (for the beginnings were good) but brought in that excesse and abuse which are followed after: For it is truely said, *That the Office of praying is a great Office in the Church.* And it is for the good of the Church, that there be consorts of men freed frō the cares of this world, who may with dayly and deuout supplications and obseruances, solicite the diuine Majesty, for the causes of the Church. But vnto this ordinance, that other hypocrisie is a nigh neighbour, neither is the generall institution to bee blamed, but those spirites which exalt themselues too high to be refrained: For euen *Enoch*, which was said to walke with GOD, did propheſie, as is deliuered vnto vs by *Iude*, and did indow the Church with the fruite of his propheſie which hee left, and *Iohn Baptist*, vnto whome they did referre, as to the author of a Monasticall life, trauailed and exercised much in the ministery both of Propheſy and Baptizing, for as to these others, who are so officious towards God, to them belongeth that question: *If thou doe iustly what is that to God, or what profite doth hee take by thy handes?* Wherefore the workes of Mercy, are they

which are the works of distinction, whereby to find out Hypocrites. But with Heretikes it is contrary, for as Hypocrites with their dissembling holinesse towardes God, doe palliate and couer their injuries toward men: so Heretikes by their morality and honest carriage towardes men, insinuate, and makes a way for their blasphemies against God.

8. *Of Impostors.*

Whether we be transported in minde it is to Godward.
Or whether we be sober, it is to youward.

THis is the true Image & true Temper of a man & of him that is Gods faithfull Workeman, his carriage & conuersation towards God, is full of passion, of zeale, & of tramisses, thence proceede grones vnspeakable, & exultings, likewise in comfort, rauishment of spirit, & agonies. But contrariwise his carriage & conuersation towardes men, is full of mildnesse, sobriety & applyable demeanor. Hence is that saying, *I am become all things to all men*, & such like.

like. Contrary it is with Hypocrits & Impoſtors, for they in the Church, and before the people, ſet themſelues on fire, & are carried, as it were, out of themſelues, & becomming as men inſpired with holy furies, they ſet heauen and earth together: but if a man did ſee their ſolitary & ſeparate Meditations, & conuerſation whereunto God is only priuy, he might towards God finde them not onely cold & without vertue, but alſo full of ill Nature and Leauen: *Sober enough to God, and tranſported onely towards men.*

9. *Of the Seuerall Kinds of Impoſture.*

Auoide prophane ſtrangenes of Words, and oppoſitions of Knowledge, falſely ſo called.
Auoide fond and idle Fables
Let no man deceiue you by high Speech

THere are three formes of ſpeaking, which are as it were the ſtile and phraſe of Impoſture: the firſt kind is of them, who aſſoone as they haue

gotten any ſubject or matter, doe ſtraight caſt it into an Art, inuenting new tearmes of Art, reducing all into diuiſions and diſtinctions, thence drawing aſſertions or poſitions, and ſo framing Oppoſitions by queſtions & anſwers. Hence iſſueth the Copwebs, and clatterings of the Schoolemen.

The ſecond kind is of them, who out of the Vanity of their Wit (as Church-Poets) do make and deuiſe all variety of Tales, Stories and examples, whereby they may leade Mens mindes to a beleefe, from whence did growe the Legends and infinite fabulous inuentions and Dreames of the ancient Heretickes.

The third kind, is of them, who fill Mens eares with Myſteries, high Parables, Allegories, and Illuſions: which myſticall and profound forme many of the Heretickes alſo made choiſe of. By the firſt kind of theſe, the Capacity and wit of man is fettered and entangled: by the ſecond, it is trained on, and inueigled: by the third, it is aſtoniſhed & enchanted, but by euery of them, the while it is ſeduced and abuſed.

10. *Of Atheiſme.*

The Foole hath ſaid in his heart, there is no God

FIrſt, it is to bee noted, that the Scripture ſaith, The Foole hath ſaid in his heart & not thought in his heart, that is to ſay, he doth not ſo fully thinke it in judgement, as he hath a good will to be of that beliefe, for ſeeing it makes not for him that there ſhould be a God, he doth ſeeke by al means accordingly to perſwade & reſolue himſelfe, & ſtudies to affirme, prooue, & verifie it to himſelfe, as ſome Theame or Poſition: All which labour, notwithſtanding that ſparkle of our Creation light, whereby men acknowledge a Deity burneth ſtill within, & in vaine doth he ſtriue vtterly to alienat it, or put it out, ſo that it is out of the corruption of his Heart and Will, and not out of the naturall apprehenſion of his Braine & Conceit, that hee doth ſet downe his opinion, as the Comical Poet ſayeth, *Then came my Minde to be of mine Opinion*, as if himſelfe & his Minde had beene two diuerſe things: therefore the Atheiſt hath rather ſaid & held it in his hart,

then thought or beleeued in his heart that there is no God. Secondly it is to be obſerued, that he hath ſaid in his heart, and not ſpoken it with his mouth. But againe you ſhall note, that this ſmothering of this perſwaſion within the heart, commeth to paſſe for feare of gouernmēt, & of ſpeech amongſt men: for as he ſaith: *To deny God in a publike Argument were much, but in a familiar conference, were currant enough.* For if this bridle were remooued, there is no Hereſie which would contend more to ſpread & multiply, & diſſeminate it ſelfe abroad, then Atheiſme, neither ſhall you ſee thoſe men, which are drencht in this frenzy of mind, to breath almoſt any thing elſe, or to inculcate euē without occaſion, any thing more then ſpeech tending to Atheiſme, as may appeare in *Lucretius* the Epicure, who makes of his inuectiues againſt Religion, as it were a burthen or verſe of returne to all his other diſcourſes: the reaſon ſeemes to be, for that the Atheiſt not relying ſufficiently vpon himſelfe, floating in minde and vnſatisfied, and induring within many faintings, and as it were fals of his opinion, deſires by other mens opinions agreeing with his, to be recouered & brogh t againe, for it is a true ſaying.

Who

Who ſo labourcth earneſtly to proue an opinion to another, himſelfe diſtruſts it. Thirdly it is a Foole that hath ſo ſaid in his heart, which is moſt true, not onely in reſpect that hee hath no taſte in thoſe thinges which are ſupernaturall and diuine: but in reſpect of humane & ciuill wiſdome: for firſt of all, if you mark the wits and diſpoſitions which are enclined to Atheiſme, you ſhall find them light, ſcoffing, impudent, & vaine: briefly, of ſuch a conſtitution, as is moſt contrary to wiſdom and morall grauity.

Secõdly amõgſt States-mẽ & politiks, thoſe which haue bin of greateſt depths, & cõpaſſe & of largeſt & moſt vniuerſal vnderſtanding, haue not only in cunning made their profite in ſeeming religious to the people, but in truth haue bin toucht with an inward ſenſe of the knowledge of Deity, as they which you ſhall euermore note, to haue attributed much to Fortune and prouidence.

Contrariwiſe, thoſe who aſcribed al things to their own cunnings & practiſes, & to the immediat & apparant cauſes: & as the Prophet ſaith, *Haue ſacrificed to their owne nets*, haue beene alwayes but petty counterfeit States-men, and not capable of the greateſt actions.

Lastly this I dare affirme in knowledge of Nature, that a litle naturall Philosophy, and the first entrance into it, doth dispose the opinion to Atheisme: But on the other side, much naturall Philosophy, & wading deepe into it, will bring about mens minds to Religion: wherfore Atheisme euery way seemes to be joyned and combined with folly and ignorance, seeing nothing can be more justly allotted to be the saying of Fooles then this, *There is no God.*

II. *Of Heresies.*

You erre not knowing the Scriptures, nor the Power of God.

THis Canon is the Mother of all Canons against Heresie: The causes of error are two: the ignorance of the will of God, and the ignorance or not sufficient consideration of his power, the will of GOD is more reuealed by the Scriptures, and therefore the precept is

Search

Search the Scriptures: the will of God is more reuealed by the Creatures, and therefore the precept is, *Behold and conſider the Creatures*: So is the fulneſſe of the power of God to be affirmed, as we make no imputation to his will, ſo is the goodneſſe of the will of GOD to be affirmed, as wee make no derogation from his power: Therfore true Religion ſeated in the meane betwixt ſuperſtition, with ſuperſtitious Hereſies on the one ſide, and Atheiſme, with prophane Hereſies on the other: Superſtition reiecting the light of the Scriptures, and giuing it ſelfe ouer to vngrounded Traditions and writings doubtfull, and not canonicall, or to new Reuelations, or to vntrue Interpretations of the Scriptures, themſelues do forge & dream many things of the will of GOD, which are ſtrange and farre diſtant from the true ſenſe of the Scriptures: But Atheiſme & Theomachy rebelleth and mutineth againſt the power of God, giuing no Faith to his word, which reuealeth his will, vpon a diſcredit and vnbeliefe of his power, to whom all things are poſſible. Now, thoſe Hereſies which ſpring out of this Fountaine, ſeeme more hainous then the other: for euen in ciuill gouernment it is held an offence in a higher degree,

gree, to deny the power and authority of a Prince, then to touch his honor and fame. Of theſe Hereſies which derogate frō the power of God beſide plaine Atheiſme, there are three degrees, & they haue all one and the ſame miſtery : for all Antichriſtianity worketh in a myſtery, that is, vnder the ſhadow of good, and it is this, to free and deliuer the will of God from all imputation and aſperſion of euill. The firſt degree, is of thoſe who make and ſuppoſe two principles contrary, and fighting one againſt the other : the one of good, the other of euill.

The ſecond degree, is of them to whom the Maieſty of God ſeemes too much wronged, in ſetting vp and erecting againſt him another aduerſe and oppoſite principle, namely, ſuch a principle as ſhould be actiue and affirmitiue, that is to ſay, cauſe or Fountaine of any Eſſence or being : therefore reiecting all ſuch preſumption, they doe neuertheleſſe bring in againſt God, a principle Negatiue, and Priuatiue, that is a cauſe of not being and ſubſiſting, for they will haue it to be an in bred proper worke, and Nature of the matter and Creature it ſelfe, of it ſelfe to turne againe, and reſolue into confuſion and nothing, not knowing that it is an ef-

fect

ſect of one and the ſame omnipotencie, to make nothing of ſome-what, as to make ſomewhat of nothing. The third degree is of thoſe, who abridge and reſtraine the former opinion only to thoſe humaine actions which pertake of ſinne: which actions, they will haue to depend ſubſtantiuely and originally, and without any ſequell or ſubordination of cauſes vpon the will, and make, and ſet downe, and appoint la ger limits of the knowledge of God then of his power, or rather of that part of Gods power (for knowledge it ſelfe is a power wherby he knoweth) then of that by which he moueth and worketh, making him foreknow ſome things idle, and as a looker on, which he doth not predeſtinate nor ordaine: Not vnlike to that deuiſe which *Epicurus*, brought into *Democritus* opinion, to take away deſtiny, and make way to fortune, to wit: the ſtart and ſlippe of *Attemus*, which alwayes of the wiſer ſort was reiected as a friuolous ſhift. But whatſoeuer depends not of God as Author & principle by inferior links & degrees, that muſt needes bee in place of God and a new principle, & a certain vſurping God: wherfore worthily is that opinion refuſed as an indignity and derogation to the Maieſty and power

power of God, and yet it is moſt truely affirmed, that God is not the Author of euill, not becauſe he is not Author, but becauſe not as of euill.

12. *Of the Church and the Scriptures.*

Thou ſhalt protect them in thy Tabernacle, from the contradiction of tongues.

THe cõtradiction of tongues doth euery where meete with vs out of the Tabernacle of God, therefore whither ſoeuer thou ſhalt turne thy ſelfe, thou ſhalt find no end of Controuerſies, except thou with-draw thy ſelfe into that Tabernacle. Thou wilt ſay it is true, and that it is to be vnderſtood of the vnity of the Church: but heare & note, there was in the Tabernacle the Arke, and in the Arke the Teſtimony or tables of the Law: what doſt thou tell me of the husk of the Tabernacle without the Kernel of the Teſtimony. The Tabernacle was ordained for the keeping and deliuering ouer from hand to hand of the teſtimony. In like maner the cuſtody and paſſing ouer of the Scriptures is committed vnto the Church. But the life of the Tabernacle is the Teſtimony.

FINIS.

OF
The Colours of Good and Euill, a Fragment.



1614.

CVi ceteræ partes vel ſectæ ſecundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum ſingulæ principatum ſibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quæque ex Zelo videtur ſumere, ſecundas autem ex vero tribuere.

2 Cuius excellentia vel exuperantiæ melior, id toto genere melius.

3 Quod ad veritatem refertur maius eſt quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio eius quod ad opinionem pertinet hac eſt. Quod quis ſi clam putaret fore facturus non eſſet.

4 Quod rem integram ſeruat bonum, quod ſine recepto eſt malum. Nam ſe recipere non poſſe impotentiæ genus eſt, potentia autem bonum.

5 Quod ex pluribus conſtat, & diuiſibilius eſt maius quàm quod ex paucioribus & magis vnum: nam omnia per partes conſiderata maiorà videntur: quare & pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ ſe fert, fortiùs autem operatur pluralitas partium ſi ordo abſit, nam inducit ſimilitudinem infiniti, & impedit comprehenſionem.

6 Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala, bonum.

7 Quod



7 *Quod bono vicinum bonum, quod à bono remotum, malum.*

8 *Quod quis culpa ſua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.*

9 *Quod opera, & virtute noſtra partum eſt, maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum eſt, minus bonum.*

10 *Gradus priuationis maior videtur quàm gradus diminutionis, & rurſus gradus inceptionis maior videtur, quam gradus incrementi.*

IN

IN deliberatiues the point is what is good, and what is euill, and of good what is greater, and of euill what is leſſe: So that the perſwaders labour is to make things appeare good or euill, and that in higher or lower degree, which as it may be performed by true and ſolide reaſons, ſo it may be repreſented alſo by colours, popularities and circumſtance, which are of ſuch force, as they ſway the ordinarie iudgement either of a weake man, or of a wiſe Man, not fully and conſiderately attending & pondering the matter. Beſides their power to alter the Nature of the ſubiect in appearance, and ſo to lead to errour, they are of no leſſe vſe to quicken & ſtrengthen the opinions and perſwaſions which are true: for reaſons plainely deliuered, and alwayes after one manner, eſpecially with fine and faſtidious mindes, enter but heauily and dully: whereas, if they bee varied and haue more life and vigour put into

them by theſe formes and inſinuations, they cauſe a ſtronger apprehenſion, and many times ſuddainely winne the mind to a reſolution. Laſtly to make a true and ſafe iudgement, nothing can be of greater vſe and defence to the mind, then the diſcouering and reprehenſion of theſe Colours, ſhewing in what caſes they hold, and in what they deceiue: which as it cannot be done, but out of a very Vniuerſall knowledge of the Nature of things, ſo being performed, it ſo cleareth mans Iudgement and election, as it is the leſſe apt to ſlide into any error.

A Table

A Table of the Colours, or apparances of *Good and Euill, and their Degrees*, as places of Perſwaſion *and Diſſwaſion, and their ſeuerall Fallaxes, and the Elenches of them.*

Cui ceteræ partes vel ſecta ſecundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum ſingulæ principatum ſibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quaque ex Zelo videtur ſumere, ſecundas autem ex vero & merito tribuere.

SO *Cicero* went about to proue the Sect of Academiques, which ſuſpended all aſſeueration, for to be the beſt: For ſaith hee, aske a Stoicke which Philoſophie is true, hee will preferre his owne. Then aske him which approacheth next the

truth, he will confesse the Academiques. So deale with the Epicure, that will scant endure the Stoicke to bee in sight of him, so soone as hee hath placed himselfe, he will place the Academiques next him.

So if a Prince tooke diuers competitors to a place, & examined them seuerally, whom next themselues they would rathest commend, it were like the ablest man should haue the most second voyces.

The fallax of this colour hapneth oft in respect of enuie, for men are accustomed after themselues and their own faction, to incline vnto them which are softest, and are least in their way, in despight and derogation of them that hold them hardest to it. So that this colour of meliority and preheminence is of a signe of enervation and weakenesse.

2 *Cuius excellentia, vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.*

APpertaining to this, are the formes: *Let vs not wander in generalities: let vs compare particular, with particular &c.* This appearance, though it seeme of strength, and rather Logicall then Rhetoricall, yet is very oft a Fallax.

Sometime

Sometime becauſe ſome things are in kind very caſuall, which if they eſcape, proue excellent, ſo that the kind is inferiour, becauſe it is ſo ſubiect to perill, but that which is excellent being proued is ſuperiour, as the bloſſome of March, and the bloſſome of May, whereof the French verſe goeth.

Burgeon de Mars enfans de Paris.
Si vne ſchape, iben vant dix.

So that the bloſſome of May is generally better then the bloſſome of March, and yet the beſt bloſſom of March is better then the beſt bloſſome of May. Sometimes becauſe the Nature of ſome kinds is to be more equall, and more indifferent, and not to haue very diſtant degrees, as hath beene noted in the warmer climates, the people are generally more wiſe, but in the Northerne climate, the wits of chiefe are greater. So in many armies, if the matter ſhould be tried by dueill betweene two Champions, the victory ſhould go on the one ſide, and yet if it be tried by the groſſe, it would goe on the other ſide: for excellencies goe as it were by chance, but kinds goe by a more certaine Nature, as by Diſcipline in Warre.

Laſtly, many kindes haue much refuſe, which counteruaile that which they haue ex-

cellent, and therefore generally mettall is more precious then Stone: and yet a Diamond is more precious then Gold.

3 *Quod ad veritatem refertur maius est quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio eius quod ad opinionem pertinet hæc est, Quod quis si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset.*

SO the Epicures say of the Stoikes felicity placed in Vertue, That it is like the felity of a Player, who if he were left of his auditory and their applause, he would straight be out of heart and countenance and therefore they cal Vertue *Bonum theatrale*. But of riches the Poet saith,

Populus me sibilat,
At mihi plaudo.

And of pleasure,

Grata sub ima
Gaudia corde premens, vultu
simulate pudorem.

The fallax of this colour is somewhat subtle, though the answere to the example bee ready, for Vertue is not chosen, *propter auram popularem*. But contrariwise, *Maxime omnium seipsum reuereri*, so as a vertuous man will be vertuous in *solitudine*, and not only in *theatro*, though

though percaſe it will bee more ſtrong by glory and Fame, as an heate which is doubled by reflection: But that denieth the ſuppoſition, it doth not reprehend the fallax, wherof the reprehenſion is a law, that vertue (ſuch as is ioyned with labour and conflict) would not be choſen but for fame & opinion yet it followeth not, that the chiefe motiue of the action ſhould not be reall and for it ſelfe, for fame may be only *cauſa impulſiua*, & not *cauſa conſtituens*, or *efficiens*. As if there were two horſes, and the one would do better without the Spur then the other: but againe, the other with the ſpur would far exceed the doing of the former, giuing him the ſpur alſo, yet the latter will be iudged to bee the better horſe, & the former as to ſay, *tuſh, the life of this horſe is but in the ſpur*, will not ſerue as to a wiſe iudgement: for ſince the ordinary Inſtrument of horſemanſhip is the ſpur and that it is no maner of impediment, nor burden, the horſe is not to be recounted the leſſe of, which will not doe well without the ſpurre, but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy, then a vertue: ſo glory & honor are the ſpurs to vertue: & although vertue would languiſh without them, yet ſince they bee alwayes at hand to attend

vertue, vertue is not to be ſaid the leſſe choſen for it ſelfe, becauſe it needeth the Spurre of fame and reputation : and therefore that poſition, *Nota eius rei quod propter opinionem & non propter veritatem eligitur, hac eſt, quod quis ſiclam putaret fore facturus non eſſet* is reprehended.

4 *Quod rem integram ſeruat, bonum, quod ſine recepto eſt, malum. Nam ſe recipere non poſſe impotentiæ genus eſt, potentia autem bonum.*

HEreof *Æſop* framed the Fable of the two Frogs that conſulted together in the time of drowth, when many plaſhes that they had repayred to, were dry what was to bee done, and the one propounded to goe downe into a deepe Well, becauſe it was like the water would not faile there: but the other anſwered, yea, but if it doe faile, how ſhall we get vp againe. And the reaſon is, that humaine actions, are ſo vncertaine and ſubiect to perils, as that ſeemeth the beſt courſe which hath moſt paſſages out of it. Appertaining to this perſwaſion, the formes are, *you ſhall engage your ſelfe*, on the other ſide, *Tantum, quantum voles ſumes ex fortuna*, you ſhall keepe the matter in your owne hand. The Reprehenſion of it is,

That

That proceeding and resoluing in all actions is necessary. For as he saith well, *not to resolue, is to resolue*, and many times it breedes as many necessities, and engageth as farre in some other sort, as to resolue. So it is but the couetous Mans disease translated in power, for the couetous Man will enjoy nothing, because he will haue his full store and possibility to enjoy the more, so by this reason a man should execute nothing because hee should bee still indifferent, and at liberty to execute any thing. Besides necessity and this same *iacta est alea*, hath many times and aduantages, because it awaketh the powers of the minde, & strengtheneth endeauour. *Cæteris paret necessitate certè superiores estis.*

5. *Quod ex pluribus constaret diuisibilius est maius quàm quod ex paucioribus & maius unum: nam omnia per partes considerata maiora videntur: quare & pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ se fert, fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, & impedit comprehensionem.*

THis colour seemeth palpable, for it is not plurality of parts without majority of parts that maketh the totall greater, yet neuertheſſe

neuerthelesse it often carries the mind away, yea it deceiueth the sense, as it seemeth to the eye a shorter distance of way if it be all dead & cõtinued, thẽ if it haue trees or buildings, or any other markes, whereby the eye may diuide it. So when a great monied man hath diuided his chests & coines, & bags, he seemeth to himselfe richer then he was, & therfore a way to amplifie any thing, is to break it, & to make Anatomy of it in seueral parts, & to examine it according to seueral circumstances. And this maketh the greater shew if it be done without order, for confusion maketh things muster more, & besides, what is set downe, by order & diuision doth demonstrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there, whereas if it be without order, both the minde comprehendeth lesse that which is set downe, and besides it leaueth a suspition, as if more might bee saide then is expressed. This colour deceiueth if the mind of him that is to be perswaded, do of it selfe ouer conceiue or prejudge of the greatnesse of any thing, for then the breaking of it will make it seeme lesse, because it maketh it appeare more according to the truth, & therefore if a man be in sicknesse or paine, the time will seeme longer without a

clocke

clocke or houre-glaſſe then with it, for the minde doth value euery moment, and then the houre doth rather ſum vp the moments, then diuide the day. So in a dead plaine, the way ſeemeth the longer, becauſe the eye hath preconceiued it ſhorter then the truth: and the fruſtrating of that maketh it ſeeme longer then the truth. Therfore, if any man haue an ouer great opinió of any thing, then if another thinke by breaking it into ſeueral conſiderations, he ſhal make it ſeeme greater to him, hee will be deceiued, and therefore in ſuch caſes it is not ſafe to diuide, but to extoll the entire ſtill in generall: Another caſe wherein this Colour deceiueth is, when the matter brokē or diuided is not cōprehended by the ſenſe or made at once in reſpect of the diſtracting or ſcattering of it, and being intire, and not diuided, is comprehended, as a hundreth pounds in heapes of fiue pounds will ſhew more then in one groſſe heape, ſo as the heapes bee all vpon one Table to bee ſeene at once, other wiſe not, as Flowres growing ſcattered in diuers beds, will ſhew more thē if they did grow in one bed, ſo as al thoſe beds bee within a Plotte, that they be obiect to view at once, otherwiſe not: &therfore men, whoſe liuing lyeth together in one

Shire

Shire, are cõmonly counted greater landed, thẽ thoſe whoſe liuings are diſperſed, though it bee more, becauſe of the notice and comprehenſion. A third caſe, wherein this colour deceiueth, and it is not ſo properly a caſe or reprehenſion, as a counter-colour, being in effect, as large as the colour it ſelfe, and that is, *Omnis compoſitio indigentiæ cuiuſdam videtur eſſe particeps*, becauſe if one thing would ſerue the turne it were euer beſt, but the defect and imperfections of things that hath broght in that helpe to peece them vp as it is ſaid, *Martha, Martha attendis ad plurima vnum ſufficit.* So likewiſe hereupon *Eſop* framed the Fable of the Fox and the Cat wheras the Fox bragged what a number of ſhifts and deuiſes he had to get from the hounds, and the Cat ſaid ſhe had but one, which was to climb a tree, which in proofe was better woorth then all the reſt, whereof the prouerb grew, *Multa novit Vulpes ſed Felis vnum magnum.* And in the morall of this fable, it comes likewiſe to paſſe, That a good ſure friend is a better helpe at a pinch, then all the ſtratagems and policies of a mans owne wit. So it falleth out to be a common error in negociating, wheras men haue many reaſons to induce or perſwade, they ſtriue commonly

monly to vtter & vſe them all at once, which weakneth them. For it argueth as was ſaid, a needines in euery of the reaſons by it ſelfe, as if one did not truſt to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himſelfe only with that, *Et quæ non proſunt ſingula multa iuuant.* Indeede in a ſet ſpeech in an aſſembly it is expected a man ſhould vſe all his reaſons in the caſe hee handleth, but in priuat perſwaſions it is alwayes a great error. A fourth caſe wherin this colour may be reprehended is, in reſpect of that ſame *vis unita fortior*, according to the table of the French K. that when the Emperors Embaſſador had recited his Maſters ſtile at large, which conſiſteth of many countries & dominions: the French K. willed his Chācellor or other miniſter, to repeat ouer Frāce as many times, as the other had recited the ſeuerall dominiōs, intēding it was equiualent with them all, & more compacted & vnited. There is alſo appertaining to this colour another point, why breaking of a thing doth helpe it, not by way of adding a ſhew of magnitude vnto it, but a note of excellency and rarity: whereof the formes are, *Where ſhall you find ſuch a concurrence? Great, but not compleate*, for it ſeemes a leſſe worke of Nature or Fortune, to make any thing in his

his kind greater then ordinary, thē to make a ſtrange compoſition. Yet if it be narrowly conſidered, this Colour wil be reprehended or encountred by imputing to all excellencies in compoſitions a kind of pouerty, or at leaſt a caſuality or jeopardy, for from that which is excellent in g eatneſſe, ſomewhat may be taken or there may be a decay, and yet ſufficiency left, but from that which hath his price in compoſition if you take away any thing or any part do faile, al is diſgraced

6 *Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala, bonum.*

THe formes to make it conceiued, that that was euill which is changed for the better are, *He that is in Hell, thinkes there is no other Heauen. Statis quercus, Acornes were good till bread was found, &c.* And of the other ſide, the formes to make it conceiued, that that was good, which was changed for the worſe, are: *Bona magis carendo quàm fruendo ſentimus: bona à tergo formoſiſſima. Good things neuer appeare in their full beauty, till they turne their backe, & be going away, &c.* The reprehenſiō of this colour is, that the good or euill which is remoued, may be eſteemed good or euill comparatiuely, and not poſitiuely or ſimply

ply. So that if the priuation be good, it followes not the former condition was euill, but lesse good, for the flowre or blossome, is a positiue good, although the remoue of it to giue place to the fruite, be a comparatiue good. So in the tale of *Æsop*, when the olde fainting man in the heate of the day cast down his burthen and called for death, and when death came to knowe his will with him, saide it was for nothing, but to helpe him vp with his burthen againe: it doth not follow, that becausse death which was the priuation of the burthen was ill, therefore the burden was good. And in this part the ordinary forme of *Malum necessarium* aptly reprehendeth this Colour, for *Priuatio mali necessaria est mala*, and yet that doth not conuert the nature of the necessary euill, but it is euill.

Againe, it commeth sometimes to passe, that there is an equality in the change of priuation, and as it were a *Dilemma boni* or a *Dilemma mali*, so that the corruption of the one good, is a generation of the other, *Sorti pater æquus utrique est* : and contrary, the remedy of the one euill, is the occasion and commencement of another, as in *Scilla* and *Charybdis*.

7. *Quod*

7 *Quod bono vicinum, bonum, quod à bono remotum, malum.*

SVch is the nature of things, that things contrary & distant in Nature and quality, are also seuered and disioyned in place, and things like and consenting in quality are placed, & as it were quartred together, for partly in regarde of the Nature, to spread, multiply, and infect in similitude, and partly, in regard of the Nature, to breake, expell, & alter that which is disagreable and contrary, most things do either associate and draw neere to themselues the like, or at least assimilate to themselues that which approacheth neere them, and doe also driue away, chase, and exterminate their contraries. And that is the reason commonly yeelded why the middle Region of the Aire should be coldest, because the Sunne and Starres are either hot by direct beames or by reflection. The direct beames heate the vpper Region, the reflected beames from the Earth & Seas, heate the lower Region. That which is in the middest, being furthest distant in place from these two Regions of heat, are most distant in Nature, that is coldest, which is that they tearme

tearme colde or hote *Per Antiperistasin*, that is, enuironing by contraries, which was pleasantly taken holde of by him that saide, that an honest man in these dayes, must needs be more honest thē in ages heretofore, *Propter Antiperistasin*: because the shutting of him in the middest of contraries must needs make the honesty stronger and more compact in it selfe. The reprehension of this colour is, first many things of amplitude in their kind doe as it were ingrosse to themselues all, and leaue that which is next them most destitute, as the Shoots or Vnderwood that grow neere a great and spread Tree is the most pined and shrubby wood of the field, because the great Tree doth depriue and deceiue them of the sap & nourishment, so hee saith well, *Diuitis servi, maxime servi*: and the comparison was pleasant of him, that compared Courtiers attendant in the Courtes of Princes, without great place or office, to fasting dayes, which were next the Holy dayes, but otherwise were the leanest dayes in all the weeke.

Another reprehension is, that things of greatnesse and predominancy, though they doe not extenuate the things adjoyning in substance, yet they drowne them & obscure

them in shew and appearance, and therefore the Astronomers say, that whereas in all other Planets conjunction is the perfectest amity: the Sun contrariwise is good by aspect, but euill by conjunction,

A third reprehension is, because euill approacheth to good sometimes for concealement, sometimes for protection: and good to euill, for conuersion and reformation. So Hypocrisie draweth neere to Religion for couert and hiding it selfe: *Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni*, and sanctuary men which were commonly inordinate men, and malefactors, were wont to be neerest to Priestes and Prelats, and holy men, for the majestie of good thinges is such, as the Confines of them are reuerend. On the other side, our Sauiour charged with neerenes of Publicanes and Rioters, saide, *The Physitian approacheth neerer the sicke then the Whole.*

8 *Quod quis culpa ſua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.*

THe reaſon is, becauſe the ſting and remorſe of the minde accuſing it ſelfe, doubleth all aduerſity: contrariwiſe, the conſidering and recording inwardly, that a Man is cleare & free from fault, & juſt imputation, doth attemper outward calamities. For if the will be in the ſenſe, & in the conſcience both, there is a gemination of it, but if euill be in the one, and comfort in the other, it is a kind of compenſation, ſo the Poets in Tragedies do make the moſt paſſionat lamentations, and thoſe that forerunne finall deſpare, to be accuſing, queſtioning, and torturing of a mans ſelfe.

Seque unum clam accuſat caputque malorum. And contrariwiſe the extremities of worthy perſons haue beene annihilated in the conſideration of their owne good deſeruing. Beſides, when the euil commeth from without, there is left a kind of euaporation of griefe, if it come by humane injury, either by indignation and meditating of reuenge from our ſelues, or by expecting of foreconceiuing, that *Nemeſis* and retribution

will take hold of the Authors of our hurt, or if it bee by fortune or accident, yet there is left a kind of expoſtulation againſt the diuine powers. *Atque Deos atque aſtra vocat crudelia mater.*

But where the euil is deriued fro a mans own fault, there all ſtrikes deadly inwards, & ſuffocateth. The reprehenſion of this colour is, firſt in reſpect of hope, for reformation of our faults is in *Nostra potestate*, but amendement of our fortune ſimply is not. Therefore *Demoſthenes* in many of his Orations ſaith thus to the people of *Athens*: *That, which hauing regard to the time paſt, is the worſt point and circumſtance of all the reſt, that, as to the time to come, is the beſt: What is that? Euen this, that by your ſloth, irreſolution, and miſgouernment your affaires are growne to this declination, and decay. For had you vſed and ordred your meanes & forces to the beſt, and done your parts euery way to the full, and notwithſtanding your matters ſhould haue gone backward in this matter as they doe, there had bene no hope left of recouery or reputation, but ſince it hath bene only by our owne errours, &c.* So *Epictetus* in his degrees ſaith, *The worſt ſtate of man is to excuſe externe things better then that to accuſe a mans ſelfe, and beſt of all to accuſe neither.*

Another

Another reprehenſion of this colour is in reſpect of the well bearing of euils, wherewith a man can charge no body but himſelfe, which maketh them the leſſe.

Leve fit quod bene fertur onus.

And therefore many natures, that are either extreamly proud, and will take no fault to themſelues, or elſe very true, and cleauing to themſelues (when they ſee the blame of any thing that fals out ill, muſt light vpon themſelues) haue no other ſhift but to beare it out well, and to make the leaſt of it: for as wee ſee when ſometimes a fault is committed, and before it bee knowne who is to blame, much adoe is made of it, but after if it appeare to bee done by a Sonne, or by a Wife, or by a neere Friend, then it is light made of. So much more when a man muſt take it vpon himſelfe. And therefore it is commonly ſeene, that women that marry Husbands of their owne chuſing againſt their Friends conſents, if they be neuer ſo ill vſed, yet you ſhall ſeldome ſee them complaine, but ſet a good face on it.

9 *Quod opera, & virtute nostra partum est maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum est, minus bonum.*

THE reasons are first the future hope, because in the fauours of others, or the good winds of Fortune, we haue no state or certainty in our endeuours or abilities wee haue. So as when they haue purchased vs one good fortune, wee haue them as ready and better edged and enuironed to procure another.

The formes be *You haue won this by play, you haue not onely the Water, but you haue the receipt, you can make it againe if it be lost, &c.* Next, because these properties which wee enjoy by the benefit of others, carry with them an obligation, which seemeth a kind of burthen, whereas the other which deriue from our selues are like the freest Parents, *Absque aliquo inde perdendo*, and if they proceede from Fortune or Prouidence, yet they seeme to touch vs secretly with the reuerence of the diuine powers, whose fauours we tast, and therefore worke a kind of religious feare and restraint, whereas in the other kind, that comes to passe, which the Prophet speaketh,

Lætantur

Lætantur exultantes, immolant plagis ſuis, & ſacrificant reti ſuo.

Thirdly, becauſe that which commeth vnto vs without our owne vertue, yeeldeth not that commendation and reputation, for actions of great felicity may drawe wonder, but praiſe-leſſe, as *Cicero* ſaid to *Caſar*, *quæ miremur, habemus, quæ laudemus expectamus.*

Fourthly, becauſe the purchaſes of our owne induſtry, are joyned commonly with labour and ſtrife, which giues an edge and appetite, and makes the fruition of our deſires more pleaſant. *Suavis cibus à venatu.*

On the other ſide, there be foure counter-Colours to this Colour rather then reprehenſions, becauſe they be as large as the Colour it ſelfe, firſt, becauſe felicity ſeemeth to be a Character of the fauour and loue of the diuine powers, & accordingly worketh both confidence in our ſelues, & reſpect & authority from others. And this felicity extendeth to many caſuall things, whereunto the care or vertue of man cannot extend, & therefore ſeemeth to be at large good, as when *Cæſar* ſaide to the Sayler, *Cæſarem portas & fortunam eius*, if hee had ſaid, *Et virtutem eius*, it had bene ſmall comfort againſt a Tempeſt,

otherwiſe then if it might ſeeme vpon merit to induce fortune.

Next, whatſoeuer is done by vertue and induſtry, ſeemes to be done by a kind of habit and art, and thereupon open to be imitated and followed, whereas felicity is inimitable: ſo wee generally ſee, that things of Nature ſeeme more excellent then thinges of art, becauſe they be imitable: for, *Quod imitabile eſt, potentia quadam vulgatum eſt.*

Thirdly, Felicity commendeth thoſe things which commeth without our owne labour, for they ſeeme giftes, and the other ſeemes peny worths: whereupon *Plutarch* ſaith elegantly of the acts of *Timoleon*, who was ſo fortunat, compared with the acts of *Ageſilaus* and *Epaminondas*, *that they were like Homers verſes, they ran ſo eaſily and ſo well.* And therefore it is the worde wee giue vnto Poeſie, terming it a happy veine, becauſe facility ſeemeth euer to come from happineſſe.

Fourthly, this ſame *Præter ſpem, vel præter exſpectatum*, doth increaſe the price and pleaſure of many things, and this cannot be incident to thoſe thinges that proceede from our owne care and compaſſe.

10 *Gradus priuationis maior videtur quàm gradus diminutionis, & rursus gradus inceptionis maior videtur, quam gradus incrementi.*

IT is a position in the Mathematiques, that there is no proportion betweene somewhat and nothing: therefore the degree of nullitie and quidity or act, seemeth larger then the degrees of increase and decrease, as to a monoculous it is more to loose one eye, then to a man that hath two eyes. So if one haue lost diuers children, it is more griefe to him to loose the last, then all the rest: because he is *spes gregis*. And therefore, *Sybilla* when she brought her three Bookes, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, because the burning of that had beene *Gradus priuationis*, and not *diminutionis*. This colour, is reprehended first in those things, the vse and seruice wherof, resteth in sufficiency, compotency, or determinate quantity: as if a man be to pay one hundreth ponnds vpon penalty, it is more to him to want xij. pence, then after that xij. pence supposed to be wāting, to wāt ten shillings more: so the decay of a mans estate seemes to be most touched in the degree,

gree, when he first growes behind, more then afterwards when he proues nothing worth. And hereof the common formes are, *Sera in fundo parsimonia*, and as good neuer a whit, as neuer the better, &c. It is reprehended also in respect of that Notion, *Corruptio vnius, generatio alterius*: so that *gradus priuationis* is many times lesse matter, because it giues the cause, and motiue to some new course. As when *Demosthenes* reprehended the people, for harkning to the conditions offered by King *Philip*, being not honorable nor equal, he saith they were but elements of their sloth and weakenesse, which if they were taken away, necessity would teach them stronger resolutions. So Doctor *Hector* was wont to say vnto the Dames of London, when they complained they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure to take any Medicine, he would tell them, their way was only to be sicke, for then they would be glad to take any Medicine.

Thirdly, this colour may bee reprehended, in respect that the degree of decrease is more sensitiue, then the degree of priuation, for the mind of men, *gradus diminutionis*, may worke a wauering betweene hope and feare, and keepe the mind in suspence, from setling

ſetling and accomodating in patience and reſolution: hereof the common formes are, *Better eye out, then alwayes ake*, make or marre, &c.

For the ſecond branch of this colour, it depends vpon the ſame generall reaſon: hence grew the common place of extolling the beginning of euery thing. *Dimidium facti qui bene cœpit habet.* This made the Aſtrologers ſo idle as to iudge of a mans nature and deſtiny by the conſtellation of the moment of his Natiuity or conception. This Colour is reprehended, becauſe many inceptions are but as *Epicurus* termeth them, *tentamenta*, that is, imperfect Offers and aſſaies, which vaniſh and come to no ſubſtance without any iteration ſo as in ſuch caſes the ſecond degree ſeemes the worthieſt, as the body horſe in the Cart, that draweth more then the forehorſe, hereof the common formes are, *the ſecond blow makes the fray, the ſecond word makes the bargaine*, *Alter principium dedit, alter modum abſtulit, &c.* Another reprehenſion of this colour is in reſpect of defatigatiõ, which makes perſeuerance of greater dignity then inception, for chance or inſtinct of nature may cauſe inception, but ſetled affection or iudgement maketh the continuance.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, this colour is reprehended in ſuch things which haue a naturall courſe and inclination, contrary to an inception. So that the inception is continually euacuated and gets no ſtart, but there behoooueth *perpetuo inceptio*, as in the common forme, *Non progredi, eſt regredi, qui non proficit, deficit*, running againſt the hill: rowing againſt the ſtreame, &c. For if it be with the ſtreame, or with the Hill, then the degree of inception is more then the reſt.

Fourthly, this colour is to be vnderſtood of *gradus inceptionis à potentia, ad actum comparatus cum gradu ab actu ad incrementum.* For otherwiſe. *Maior videtur gradus ab impotentia, ad potentiam, quam à potentia ad actum.*

FINIS.